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ABSTRACT 
Sri Lanka has suffered a violent conflict between the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) 
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for nearly three decades. By the time 
LTTE was crushed in 2009, over 80,000 had been killed, 11,656 Tamil Tigers were either 
arrested or surrendered, and 294,000 people had been internally displaced during the final 
phase of the conflict. Furthermore, almost all the infrastructure in formerly terrorist-held 
areas was damaged or destroyed. The GoSL recognized its obligation to provide 
humanitarian relief; essential services, rehabilitation, and development support to people 
in LTTE-controlled areas and began post-conflict reconstruction. The GoSL decision to 
house internally displaced persons (IDPs) prevented much-needed, international-
community support during the initial stage of reconstruction. The drain of GoSL 
resources due to the prolonged conflict and reconstruction in the Eastern Province forced 
GoSL to use the military to fill gaps in the post-conflict reconstruction process. By doing 
so, the GOSL was able to resettle 97% of the total IDPs, providing them infrastructure 
facilities and livelihood opportunities, while reintegrating more than 90% of ex-
combatants after their rehabilitation by the end of 2011. This study will examine the way 
in which the military used its capabilities to shape the reconstruction process.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Sri Lanka, a pear-shaped island nation in the Indian Ocean, was called Serandib in 
ancient history and later Ceylon during the colonial era. Located about eighteen miles off 
the southeastern coast of the Indian subcontinent, the island occupies a strategic location 
in the Indian Ocean astride important trade routes.  For this reason, Ceylon was occupied 
by successive waves of invaders from India, Portugal, Holland, and, from 1802, 
England.1 The population is divided between Sinhalese, whose primary religion is 
Buddhism, and Tamils, a Hindu population that migrated from southern India at least two 
millennia ago. The Tamil numbers were reinforced by the British, who imported Tamils 
from southern India to work on tea plantations in the central part of the island. British 
policy favored the Tamils with government jobs, so when Ceylon was granted 
independence in 1948, tensions between the two groups gradually increased. 2  Civil war 
broke out in 1983 when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) launched an 
insurgency, which an Indian invasion and at least four internationally and locally 
brokered ceasefires failed to halt.  
The LTTE evolved into a ruthless and powerful insurgency with separate sea and 
air wings, in addition to ground forces organized similar to a conventional army, with 
heavy artillery and ground-to-air missiles. 3 By 2006, the LTTE unofficially controlled 
two thirds of Sri Lankan territorial waters and one third of Sri Lankan territory.4 The 
Tigers proclaimed an independent Tamil state called Tamil Eelam in the north and east of 
the island.5 By the time the LTTE was crushed in 2009, over 80,000 had been killed, 
11,000 Tamil Tigers were captured or surrendered, 6 and 294,000 people had been made 
                                                 
1 K.M.De Silva, History of Sri Lanka (CA: University of California, 1981) 3–254. 
2 Ibid., 486. 
3 Asoka Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy 
(New York: Routledge, 2009) 197. 
4 Neil Devotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri 
Lanka,” Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 6 (November/December 2009) 1023.  
5 Sumantra Bose, Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010) 69-89. 
6 Ibid. 
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refugees in the north.7 Furthermore, almost all the infrastructure in formerly terrorist-held 
areas in the north and east was either damaged or destroyed8 and most agricultural land 
was sewn with mines and unexploded ordinance or abandoned, due to damaged irrigation 
systems. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHETICAL ARGUMENT 
In this thesis, I analyze the roles and missions performed by the Sri Lankan armed 
forces in the post-conflict process between 2009 and 2011.  Specifically, I want to 
examine the way in which the military used its capabilities to shape reconstruction.  The 
questions to be explored include the following: What military capabilities have been used 
in the reconstruction process? What role does the military play in that process? Has the 
military reorganized itself to conduct these reconstruction roles?  
The research question described above is relevant for three main reasons. First, 
there is a great need to define the military’s role in the reconstruction process, because Sri 
Lanka is still facing considerable challenges relating to demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR). The success of the post-conflict process, which includes DDR, will largely 
depend on the military.  Hence, this study will contribute to our understanding of the 
military’s role in postwar Sri Lanka. 
Second, since the defeat of the LTTE in 2009, there has been a demand for 
military downsizing, restructuring, and reform.  Consequently, the army needs to redefine 
its mission in a diminished threat environment, improve efficiency and effectiveness, and 
reestablish civilian control during the transitional period. 
Finally, the findings of this study should enhance our understanding of how 
countries transition from war to post-conflict in the absence of an explicit peace 
agreement.  Indeed, most studies available on post-conflict resolution assume that a peace 
agreement is necessary for a durable peace and reconstruction. However, the Sri Lankan 
                                                 
7 Government of Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka’s Humanitarian Effort: Presidential Task Force for 
Resettlement and Security in the Northern Province-2011 (Sri Lanka: Government of Sri Lanka, 2011), 79. 
http://www.defence.lk/news/pdf/20110829_SRILANKAS_HE.pdf (accessed November 14, 2011). 
8 Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, Sri Lanka: Recharging U.S Strategy After the 
War (Washington: U.S Government Printing Office, 2009) 5. 
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SRI.pdf  (accessed September 12, 2011). 
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case deviates from the norm in the sense that reconstruction was undertaken in the 
absence of a formal peace agreement.  This provides an opportunity to assess the 
reconstruction process in the aftermath of victory in a civil war.   
Before discussing the working hypotheses, it is worthwhile to further clarify the 
scope and domain of this study.  The study will focus on two types of roles played by the 
military: conventional and reconstruction.  The former refers to missions and roles related 
to national defense, multinational peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, and national-disaster 
response. By contrast, the so-called reconstruction roles include de-mining, route 
construction, irrigation, clearing farmlands, building public infrastructure and housing, 
and reintegration of former combatants. 
With regards to these roles, the study proposes the following three working 
hypotheses. First, I examine the extent to which the army is capable (or incapable) of 
performing reconstruction roles.  If the military has not been trained or instructed to 
perform such roles in the past, it might not be capable of performing them at all during 
the post-conflict process (2009–2011). This hypothesis thus explores the question of 
whether the army has the capabilities needed to perform reconstruction roles.   
The second hypothesis explores the relationship between conventional and non-
conventional military roles, examining the extent to which the latter affects the military’s 
ability to carry out the former when it is increasingly engaged in reconstruction.  From 
this perspective, the second hypothesis suggests that reconstruction roles, as currently 
performed by the army, have undermined conventional military roles.  If this hypothesis 
holds, then reconstruction roles may ultimately erode military reform and restructuring, 
affecting both effectiveness and efficiency. 
Finally, I assess the impact of military reconstruction roles on the state itself.  In 
particular, I hypothesize that the military’s engagement in reconstruction ultimately 
undermines the state’s capacity to provide basic services, since it makes the state more 
dependent on the military while eroding civilian capacities, especially in activities 
relating to development and infrastructure. 
 
  4 
B. BACKGROUD TO THE CONFLICT 
The history of Sri Lanka can be traced to the fifth century B.C.E, when Vijaya, 
the “founding father of Sri Lanka,” arrived from northern India.9 Sri Lankan Aryan 
colonization spread over the country gradually and settlements were established in 
several parts of the island, which finally turned into a kingdom. No firm evidence exists 
to pinpoint exactly when the Tamils first came to Sri Lanka,10 but it is believed that they 
migrated either as invaders or peaceful immigrants beginning in the second century 
B.C.E. 11  Sri Lanka’s demography has evolved over time due to trade, cultural, religious, 
political, and military movement.12 Furthermore, because south-Indian invasions mostly 
concentrated on the north-central part of the country, the Tamils concentrated in the north 
and east of the island, while the Sinhalese lived mostly in the south and west. LTTE 
propaganda claims that Tamils were the original inhabitants of the north and east of Sri 
Lanka. Rather, the Sinhalese migrated south to escape historic invasions from southern 
India, while southern Indian invaders ruled the county’s capital time and again.  While 
some contemporary historians see these invasions as forming the basis of an 
irreconcilable age-old ethnic hostility, the truth is that there were long periods of cultural 
and commercial exchanges between the two communities. 13  
State fragmentation due to disputes among ruling elites facilitated Portuguese 
encroachment from the sixteenth century, followed by Dutch encroachment in the 
seventeenth.14 But these European occupations clung to the coast and left the interior of 
the island to the Kandyian kingdom.15  
                                                 
9 De Silva, History of Sri Lanka, 3. 
10 Ibid., 12. 
11 Ibid. 
12 International Crisis Group, Sri Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism and the Elusive Southern Consensus, 
Asia Report N 141, (Colombo/Brussels, International Crisis Group, 2007) 3. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/sri-
lanka/sri_lanka___sinhala_nationalism_and_the_elusive_southern_consensus.ashx (accessed August 21. 
2011). 
13 Helen Yana. Copulos, and Joseph Hanlon, Civil War, Civil Peace (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
2006) 69–112. 
14 Russell R. Ross and Andrea Matles Savada, Area Handbook for Sri Lanka (Washington: Library of 
Congress, 1990) 17–24. 
15 De Silva, History of Sri Lanka, 113–233. 
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This kingdom’s fatal decision to request English East India Company assistance to fight 
the Dutch resulted in Ceylon being declared a crown colony of England in 1802.16  
Unlike the Portuguese and Dutch, the British established a capital at Colombo and 
developed cities such as Kandy, Galle, Jaffna, Matara and Bandarawela, whose economy 
was built mainly around tea, rubber, coco, and cinnamon plantations established around 
Ceylon and worked by south-Indian Tamils imported by the British. Indian Tamil 
immigrants totaled 651,000 by 1931, a fifth of Ceylon’s population.17 Sinhalese 
nationalist leaders argued that Indian Tamil immigrants were temporary residents “with 
no commitment to Sri Lanka.”18 Sinhalese have seen Tamil immigrants as limiting 
employment opportunities for Sinhalese, whose lands were appropriated by colonial 
rulers.  
While speaking the same language as Sri Lankan Tamils, the more recent 
immigrants from India are considered a group distinct from the ancient community of Sri 
Lankan Tamils. Though British missionary schools educated both Sinhalese and Tamils, 
the British exploited Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism through their divide-and-rule 
policies that allowed Tamils access to government jobs because Tamils excelled in the 
English language. Due to this marginalization, the Sinhalese rallied around their local 
leaders and against colonial power in a counter-colonial movement, using Buddhist 
identities in the late nineteen and early twentieth centuries. However, Tamils also joined 
the anti-colonial movement.      
Following independence in 1948, the situation was reversed, and the nationalist 
Sinhalese majority began to discriminate against the more recently settled Tamils by 
depriving them of citizenship in a successful bid to reduce their electoral influence in the 
central hills. 19 Interestingly, this was supported by a number of Sri Lankan Tamil 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 239. 
17 International Crisis Group, Sri Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism and the Elusive Southern Consensus, 
2007, 4. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Rohan Gunarathna, The Changing face of Terrorism, (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 
2005) 14–25.  
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leaders, “undermining their own late claims for minority rights.”20 Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalism was impelled from 1956, when S.W.R.D Banadaranaike abandoned the 
multiracial policies adopted by previous governments. Its main election promise was to 
establish Sinhala as the only official language in the government of Sri Lanka.21 This 
decision was a major blow to minority Tamils. The Tamil Federal Party, led by C.J.V 
Chelvanayakam, demanded greater protection of minority rights, including citizenship for 
south-Indian plantation workers in the central hills and regional autonomy for northern 
and eastern Tamil-dominated areas. The then prime minister agreed to the “reasonable 
use of the Tamil language” and “limited devolution of power to regional council.”22 But 
Sinhalese public opinion opposed these reforms, which led to communal riots in 1956 
and 1958.23  
Nevertheless, moderate Tamil politicians tried to find a solution through a 
peaceful political struggle. However, this was undermined when South Indians, who were 
canvassing for a “separate Dravidian state” in India, transferred their support to northern 
and eastern Sri Lanka for a separate Tamil state “after India adapted the draconian anti-
secessionist amendment to its constitution in 1963.”24 Elder, mature politicians were 
against the idea of a separate state, but they looked for devolution of power to the 
Northern and Eastern provinces and signed another pact in 1965 between Chelvanayakam 
and Dudley Senenayake (then prime minister) called the “Dudeley–Chelvanayakam 
pact.”25 This agreement, like the previous one, was never implemented.26  
The United Front government that came to power adopted “university 
standardization,” allowing educationally underprivileged youths in rural areas to enter 
                                                 
20 International Crisis Group, Sri Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism and the Elusive Southern Consensus, 
2007, 4. 
21 Ibid., 5. 
22 Ibid., 6. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Bandarage,  The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy, 177. 
25 International Crisis Group, Sri Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism and the Elusive Southern Consensus, 
2007, 6. 
26 Ibid. 
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university while depriving the opportunity to educationally advanced districts.27 Since 
Jaffna (the main city in the north) was considered one of the educationally advanced 
districts, Tamils felt that they had been unfairly penalized. Meantime, in 1971, Sri Lanka 
experienced a violent uprising to overthrow the government by the right-wing Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a “splinter group that emerged out of the communist party 
(Peking).”28 The government eliminated the JVP insurgency after declaring a state of 
emergency. In 1972, the Sri Lankan government introduced a new constitution that was 
opposed by Tamil politicians because it entrenched Sinhala as the official language, 
while giving Buddhism a prominent place among other religions.  
With this background, on May 1976, Tamil politicians met in the northern 
province of Vaddukkkodai29 and managed to pass a majority resolution seeking 
“restoration and reconstruction of the free, sovereign, secular, socialist state of Tamil 
Eelam based on the rights of self-determination.”30 They protested restricted citizenship 
and franchise rights for South Indian Tamils, the Sinhala-only language policy, the lack 
of equal rights for employment and education, state-planned colonization in Tamil areas, 
allocating  Buddhism a favored position and principal place in the constitution, the 
exclusion of “Sri Lankan Tamils from mainstream Tamil culture in South India,” 
authorizing and allowing “communal violence against Tamils, terrorizing, torturing, and 
imprisoning Tamil youth, and imposing an unacceptable constitution on the Tamils.”31. 
 Though the terrorists groups were formed before the Vaddukkkodai conference, a 
new wave of terrorist attacks began soon after, which some believed facilitated by 
elements in India.32 Prominent among supporters of Tamil independence was M.G. 
Ramachandran, former chief minister of south India and a man the LTTE considered its 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Rajesh Venugopal, “Sectarian Socialism: The Politics of Sri Lanka’s Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 
(JVP),” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 44. No. 3 (2010), Cambridge University Press, 567–602. 
       29 Wijadasa Rajapakse, “The Way Forward to Achieve Long Lasting Ethnic Reconciliation,” 
Transcurrents, August 2011, http://transcurrents.com/news-views/archives/2727  (accessed August 29, 
2011). 
30 A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, The Break- up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese Tamil Conflict (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii press, 1988) 88–89. 
31 Palitha Ruwan Wanigasuriya, The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: A clash of Civilizations (master’s 
thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1997) 8.  
32 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy, 1. 
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“godfather.”33 The LTTE exploited international links through south India to train their 
cadres.34 
The Sri Lankan government started to change its hardline policies by adapting a 
new constitution in 1978. This constitution provided citizenship to South Indian Tamils 
while recognizing Tamil as a national language.35 However, Tamil politicians claimed 
that recognition of Tamil was ineffective since “there was little effort to implement it.”36 
Meanwhile, many Tamil terrorist groups emerged, aiming at a common goal of 
establishing “a separate state of Tamil Eelam in the north and east of Sri Lanka.”37 
However, majority Tamils did not support the terrorist movement until the 1983 riots.      
The Indian government covertly supported Sri Lankan terrorist organizations 
from August 1983 for several reasons,38 beginning with New Delhi’s objection to Sri 
Lanka’s pro-Western policy after 1977, Sri Lanka’s friendly relations with China and 
Pakistan, and a powerful Voice of America transmitting station in Sri Lanka.39 Sri 
Lanka’s willingness to offer Trincomalee harbor to the United States also annoyed New 
Delhi.40 Furthermore, the hostile relationship between then Sri Lankan president, J R 
Jayawardena and the Indian prime minister, Indira Gandhi, aggravated the mistrust.41 
Therefore, “Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents [were] provided sanctuary, finance, training and 
                                                 
33 Rohan Gunarathna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, 
(Colombo : South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1993), xiv. 
34 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, Jane’s Terrorism and 
Insurgency Centre, 14. 
http://jtic.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/JDIC/JTIC/nonTaxonomyselection.do?nonTaxnom. (accessed 
August 15, 2011) 
35 Government of Sri Lanka, “The Parliament of Sri Lanka, 1978 Constitution,” 
http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/1978ConstitutionWithoutAmendments.pdf (accessed 
August 10, 2011). 
36 Wanigasuriya, The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: A clash of Civilizations, 9. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Rohan Gunarathna, “The Eight Man Team, International and Regional Implications of the Sri 
Lankan Tamil Insurgency,” IRRP, 2006, https://lrrp.wordpress.com/2006/02/03/nternational-and-regional-
implications-of-the-sri-lankan-tamil-insurgency-by-rohan-gunaratne/ (accessed August 10, 2011). 
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weapons either by the central government or state government of Tamil Nadu.”42 Due to 
Indian assistance, Tamil terrorist strength grew rapidly and “by 1986, the number of 
Indian trained, armed and financed militants exceeded 20,000,”43 although this number 
was seriously underestimated by Sri Lankan security authorities.44 In 1987, a coordinated 
campaign by the Sri Lankan government to eradicate terrorism from Sri Lankan soil45 
was frustrated by New Delhi, which intervened to prevent Jaffna from being captured by 
Sri Lankan forces.46 When Colombo attempted to capture Jaffna nonetheless, India 
launched a flotilla into Sri Lankan territorial waters and dispatched transport planes, 
escorted by fighter jets, over the island to drop supplies to the Tamils, while 
diplomatically and militarily pressuring the Sri Lankan government to abort the military 
action against Tamil terrorists.47 “Indian intervention saved the LTTE from an imminent 
defeat by the Sri Lankan Military,” Asia Report concluded, and allowed Tamil terrorists 
to escape into Tamil Nadu.48 
India subsequently sent an Indian peacekeeping force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka to 
oversee a peace accord brokered by New Delhi. But the intervention failed, largely 
because India was not seen as a neutral party and because it was attacked by the LTTE 
following an Indian attempt to disarm them. The Indian peacekeeping force (IPKF) 
finally departed Sri Lanka in 1990, after suffering 1,550 fatalities and double the number 
wounded.49 After the withdrawal of the IPKF, terrorist groups fought each other for 
supremacy, a battle from which the LTTE emerged as the sole terrorist organization. The 
IPKF withdrawal left the LTTE in control of roughly a third of Sri Lanka for the first 
time in its history.  
                                                 
42 Gunarathna, “The Eight Man Team, International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan 
Tamil Insurgency.”  
43 Gunarathna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, vii. 
44 Ibid., 93. 
45 Sri Lanka Army, Sri Lanka Army: 50 Years On, 1949–1999 (Singapore: Aitken Spence Printing 
(Pvt) Ltd, 1999) 397–399. 
46 Gunarathna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, xii. 
47 Ibid., 183. 
48 Sri Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism and the Elusive Southern Consensus, Asia Report, 8. 
49 Gunarathna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The role of India’s Intelligence Agencies, vii. 
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The Sri Lankan government and LTTE were involved in six official negotiations 
during their 26-year conflict: the Thimpu talks, the Delhi accord, the all-party conference, 
the Indo-Lanka peace accord, the Sri Lankan government-LTTE peace talks in 1990, and 
the Sri Lankan government peace talks in 1995.50 Under the leadership of president 
Chandrika Kumaratunge Bandaranayake, the government proposed a devolution of 
powers to the provinces, which had not been offered before in any peace negotiations. 
The government offered to implement a federal system, with each regional government 
given control over land, law and order, education, local government, housing and 
construction, agriculture, and industrial development. Meanwhile, the central government 
would retain control over defense, national security, foreign affairs, international 
economic relations, and the national media. Tamil political parties showed their 
willingness to accept the proposal. Even though certain Sinhalese political parties 
expressed discomfort, Colombo was determined to implement the proposal as a solution 
to the prolonged conflict. However, the LTTE rejected the government proposal and 
ended the peace talks by exploding a bomb in Colombo, killing over twenty people and 
injuring many more.51  
A Norwegian-facilitated negotiation in 2002 was a significant landmark in the 
separatist war. The Norwegian-brokered ceasefire lasted four years, despite the fact that 
the LTTE committed numerous ceasefire violations, capped by the assassination of the 
Sri Lankan foreign minister, a world-renowned human-rights activist and scholar. Even 
so, the relative suspension of hostilities provided opportunity for the government to carry 
out reconstruction in LTTE-held areas. The downside was that peace negotiations 
bestowed legitimacy on the LTTE,52 which was recognized as the de facto authority in a 
large portion of the country.  Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were forced to 
pay taxes to LTTE, even as they carried out reconstruction work in LTTE-controlled 
areas. The LTTE continued to carry out atrocities and, overestimating its own military 
capabilities, walked away from negotiations. However, when the LTTE closed the sluice 
                                                 
50 Wanigasuriya, The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: A clash of Civilizations, 9. 
51 Ibid., 10. 
52 Jayadewa Uyangoda,  Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Changing Dynamics (Washington: East West 
center, 2007) 40. 
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gate of the Mavil Aru reservoir in 2006, Colombo launched an offensive that culminated 
three years later in an LTTE defeat on 19 May 2009.  This set the stage for postwar 
reconstruction. 
C. PROBLEMS OF POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN SRI LANKA 
The defeat of the LTTE opened a real and tangible prospect for establishment of 
long-lasting peace. However, there were no peace accords to end hostilities and provide a 
framework for reconstruction as the Sri Lankan military crushed the LTTE. The sole 
winner of the conflict was the government, and government had the ability to implement 
winner’s choice in Sri Lanka. However, Colombo was very much aware of the grievances 
of the Tamils, which had finally lead to an armed struggle, and the suffering of innocent 
Tamils under the clutches of the LTTE. Therefore, the government showed an eagerness 
to address the problems that caused the conflict in the first place and to cement the 
victory over the LTTE. 
Sri Lankan post-conflict challenges fall into two main categories:  the first 
includes immediate humanitarian and human-rights issues and long-term and sustainable 
economic development in affected areas. The second is the search for a political solution 
to address the long-term grievances of minority Tamils. Even before the war ended, there 
were expressions of concern over human-rights issues from the international community.  
David Miliband and Bernard Kouchner, the foreign ministers of Britain and France, 
respectively, visited Sri Lanka in April 2009 with the intention of drawing the Sri Lankan 
government’s attention “to the human suffering, and to call for the fighting to stop.”53 
Some argue that this visit was an attempt by “Western powers and international 
organizations to prevent the final rout of the LTTE and its leader.”54 The peace 
intervention did not succeed, due to the government’s reluctance to step away from 
military action when it was on the cusp of victory. Colombo’s position was that, for the 
                                                 
53 David Miliband and Bernard Kouchner, “The Silence of Sri Lanka,” The New York Times, June 20, 
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fighting to stop, the LTTE should unconditionally surrender to government forces. Soon 
after the defeat of LTTE, the government came under tremendous pressure from the 
international community, especially from Western countries, due to the human suffering 
at the last stage of the war and the government’s decision to accommodate all internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) in government-run IDP centers (which were portrayed as 
concentration camps in propaganda and demonstrations by the Tamil diaspora in Western 
countries). The United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, visited Sri Lanka four 
days after the war ended to assess the situation and issued a joint statement with the Sri 
Lankan government reiterating the “strongest commitment to the promotion and 
protection of human rights.”55 Political leaders had to convince the Tamil diaspora and 
international community that the government of Sri Lanka was working to rebuild a new 
Sri Lanka, with a multiethnic, multicultural, multi-religious and multilingual policy.  
Soon after the defeat of the Tamil Tigers, the government began to restore the 
Northern and Eastern provinces to normalcy.  In the words of Spinoza, peace is not the 
mere absence of open violent conflict, but an innate predisposition towards benevolence, 
confidence, and justice.  Former Indian prime-minister Jawaharlal Nehru put it thus: 
peace is not a relationship of nations. It is a condition of mind brought by serenity of 
soul.  Peace of not merely the absence of war.  It is also a state of mind.  Lasting peace 
comes only to peaceful people.  It was important for the Sri Lankan government to win 
the peace in a society that had been indoctrinated, ruled, and mobilized by the LTTE.  
The Sri Lankan government needed to show that it understood the importance of 
reconciliation by building confidence, trust, and tolerance.  Furthermore, the government 
needed to provide justice through equity and equality to deprived citizens.  This led the 
government to consider rebuilding society through reconstruction, resettlement, 
reintegration, and reconciliation.  However, the government was also concerned about 
national security and the safety and security of IDPs while achieving a long-lasting peace.  
All these preventive measures were seen as important to prevent reoccurrence of violence 
and conflict.  
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Locally, the Sri Lankan government faced a number of problems soon after the 
defeat of terrorism. Some of the problems were accommodating the more than 294,000 
IDPs in welfare centers and relief villages; providing basic needs and shelter; identifying 
the LTTE cadres who had merged with the civilians (which prevented the government 
from allowing free movement for IDPs until the screening process was over); restoring 
IDPs’s economic income to secure their livelihood upon their return home; rebuilding 
infrastructure in rebel-held areas, which had deteriorated due to war and decades of 
neglect: restoring irrigation systems for agriculture (some due to LTTE action by 
demolished water tanks); repairing destruction and damage to railway and trunk-road 
connections through rebel-held areas; rewiring the power-supply line from the national 
grid to rebel-held areas; rebuilding telecommunication facilities; restoring trade; 
removing large quantities of mines and IEDs, laid to prevent the advance of government 
forces; clearing arable lands that had not been cultivated for years; rehabilitating and 
reintegrating surrendered or captured LTTE cadres; and developing the stagnate 
economies of liberated areas and the country as a whole. 
The government has been eager to implement precautionary measures to prevent a 
resurgence of violence and conflict. In the interests of national security, the government 
was reluctant to allow international, non-governmental organizations (INGOs) to have 
access to IDPs until the screening process was complete. This precaution impeded much-
needed international support at the beginning of reconstruction.  Therefore, the 
government of Sri Lanka had to rely on national resources for the reconstruction in the 
initial stage.  However, these resources were limited due to economic conditions in the 
country.  
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II. PLANNING FOR POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION—
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
In this chapter, the role played by the GoSL and INGOs in the post-conflict 
reconstruction process, along with challenges that the GoSL faced, will be examined. 
This will reveal the reasons for government to use the military for post-conflict 
reconstruction since 2009. Studying overall post-conflict reconstruction strategies, the 
mechanism advanced by the government and INGOs to overcome challenges, and the 
part played by the military in the overall concept will assist me in examining the way in 
which the military used its capabilities to shape reconstruction.  
In this context, this chapter will discuss the role played by the GoSL and INGOs 
in the post-conflict reconstruction process under the following headings. First, to 
understand the government mechanism, the GoSL’s resettlement and reconstruction 
mechanism before the end of the conflict will be discussed. Second, the mechanism put 
forward by the GoSL after the conflict to meet the challenges that arose due to handling 
of IDPs, resettlement, and reconstruction will be discussed, with special emphasis on 
humanitarian assistance, assistance in resettlement, and livelihood opportunities. Third, 
the devastation in Northern Province will be examined to understand the ground realities 
and how it facilitated military involvement. Fourth, consideration will be given to the 
mechanism for rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants, in order to determine 
the role of the military in the process. Fifth, the involvement of INGOs in post-conflict 
reconstruction will be considered to discover their role in the overall process and how the 
military was involved in INGO activities. Finally, a conclusion will be formulated from 
the findings in this chapter. This chapter will argue that a shortage of resources and 
coordination difficulties within the government compelled the GoSL to use the military 
for post-conflict reconstruction, resettlement, and reintegration. 
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A. THE GOSL’S RESETTLEMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION 
MECHANISM BEFORE THE END OF THE CONFLICT  
Though there were few evidences in the Sri Lankan history, recent internal 
displacement in Sri Lanka happened in 1983 because of the Sinhalese and Tamil 
communal riots that erupted after the commencement of terrorism.56 However, once the 
situation was brought under control, almost all returned to their native places or migrated. 
Sinhalese living in Northern Province were forced out by the Tamils, who sought to 
transform the north of Sri Lanka into a Tamil homeland.57 In 1990, 75,000 Muslims were 
forcibly evicted from Northern Province by the LTTE within the short space of forty-
eight hours.58 Even Tamils in the northern and eastern provinces, especially those 
deemed insufficiently supportive of the cause of Tamil independence, were forced to flee 
LTTE violence. Though the initial response of the GoSL was reactive as the number of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) surged, the GoSL established IDP centers outside 
Northern and Eastern provinces, providing basic facilities. In 1991, the GoSL established 
a ministry of rehabilitation and social welfare, which included a resettlement and 
rehabilitation authority to handle the increasing number of IDPs.59 In 1995, as 
government forces progressively liberated the Jaffna Peninsula and areas to the south 
from LTTE control,60 the GoSL redesignated the task to a new ministry of resettlement, 
rehabilitation and refugees. While this ministry tried to orchestrate a national framework 
to deal with IDPs, it was frustrated by bureaucratic infighting and redundancy among the 
myriad ministries, departments, and authorities that were also involved in the IDP 
process.61 
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(accessed on December 24, 2011). 
61 Robert, Relocation Failures in Sri Lanka: A Short History of Internal Displacement and 
Resettlement, 153. 
  17 
Furthermore, following the signing in 2002 of the Norwegian-facilitated ceasefire, 
in April 2004 the GoSL renamed the “Ministry for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and 
Refugees” into the “Ministry for Relief, Rehabilitation, and Reconciliation,” 62 just 
months before a deadly tsunami devastated the coastal areas of Sri Lanka, killing an 
estimated 40,000 people and displacing many more. Among the ministry’s functions was 
providing “relief to IDPs, both conflict and tsunami affected, resettlement and relocation 
of IDPs in the northeast, rehabilitate damaged social and economic infrastructure in the 
north and east, promote activities leading to ethnic reconciliation, and payment of 
compensation to conflict-affected persons.”63 
After the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) came to power, winning the 
presidential election in November 2005 and general election in April 2004, the GoSL 
strengthened and broadened the functions of the ministries to provide efficient service by 
reassigning the subjects, functions, departments, and statutory institutions of the 
ministries. However, the establishment of new ministries for efficient handling of 
growing demands further aggravated overlapping responsibilities and created 
coordination difficulties within the GoSL, which had put forth a genuine effort towards 
solving problems. Unclear responsibilities and coordination difficulties among central-
government institutions created unclear responsibilities among provisional government 
institutions, too. The Asian Development Bank, which finances many projects in Sri 
Lanka, has highlighted the “unclear division of functions between provisional and central 
government” as a weakness in Sri Lanka.64  
Once the LTTE opted out of the 2002 Norwegian-facilitated peace process and 
closed off land access to the Jaffna Peninsula, the government faced an uphill task of 
maintaining essential services in the peninsula and terrorist-controlled areas. To 
overcome this difficulty and maintain essential services, in August, 2006, the government 
of Sri Lanka “appointed a commissioner-general of essential services (CGES) to maintain 
                                                 
62 Sri Lanka Development Forum , “Creating Our Future Building Our Nations,” 2005, 8. 
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63 Ibid.,  
64 Asian Development Bank, Country Partnership Strategy, Sri Lanka 2009-2011, 11,  
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all essential services,” such as food and healthcare in the Jaffna Peninsula and terrorist-
held areas in Vanni.65 Despite the fact that the GoSL had separate institutions to look 
after those subjects, the appointment of a commissioner-general of essential services 
demonstrated again the coordination difficulties among government institutions. 
After the liberation of Eastern Province in 2007, a reconstruction and resettlement 
process was carried out under the “Nagenahira Udanaya,” a government plan for 
reconstruction of the Eastern province. Nagenahira Udanaya offered an opportunity for 
hands-on experience before commencing reconstruction in the Northern Province.66 On 
the whole, Nagenahira Udanaya successfully completed infrastructure repairs and de-
mining and restored water supplies and electricity so that elections could be held under 
normal conditions.67 This resulted in a drain on government resources while the GoSL 
was involved in high-intensity conflict with the LTTE in Northern Province. Military 
involvement in Northern Province, hampered the military’sability to carry out 
reconstruction in Eastern Province, which was limited to de-mining and construction of a 
few roads and bridges.  
B. HANDLING OF IDPS, RESETTLEMENT, AND RECONSTRUCTION  
Even before the defeat of the LTTE, the GoSL recognized an obligation to 
provide humanitarian relief, essential services, rehabilitation, and development support to 
people in LTTE-controlled areas.68  As the conflict progressed and it became apparent 
that government forces were on the verge of the total liberation of LTTE-controlled areas, 
the GoSL recognized that its task would go beyond infrastructure repair and de-mining—
it must help to heal the wounds of twenty-six years of conflict through reconstruction and 
reconciliation. The GoSL emphasized the importance of the reconstruction of Northern 
Province, a project that had been repeatedly highlighted by government officials, 
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66 International Monetary fund, Staff Country Reports, 2009. 
67 Ibid. 
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including the president, as the “duty and responsibility” of the government.69 The 
northern reconstruction process encompassed both long-term development plans and 
resettlement and welfare programs for IDPs. Initially, the primary attention of 
government reconstruction was towards basic humanitarian assistance to IDPs, 
resettlement, “restoration of law and order, conducting local government, and provincial 
council elections.”70 
Because Sri Lanka is a developing country, and due to its involvement in a 
prolonged conflict, Colombo needed the support of the international community to carry 
out effective and efficient reconstruction and reconciliation. During the later stages of the 
conflict, especially from the end of 2008 to mid-April 2009, 65,000 IDPs crossed over to 
government-controlled areas, where they were housed in public buildings.71  Anticipating 
a larger influx of IDPs once the conflict concluded definitively, the GoSL initially 
discussed its post-conflict strategy at the twenty-fifth meeting of the Consultative 
Committee of Humanitarian Assistance (CCHA) on November 21, 2008.72 In February 
2009, the ministry of resettlement and disaster relief services formulated an action plan in 
immediate response to the urgent need of IDPs.73 Based on the government’s decision to 
house IDPs in the same district, “welfare villages” were planned to accommodate 
anticipated IDPs in the Vavuniya and Mannar districts in Northern Province. These 
villages were “designed to have semi-permanent structures, roads, electricity, learning 
centers, post offices, cooperative shops, parks, places of worship, banks, IT centers, 
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child- and woman-development centers, etc.”74 “Welfare villages” was a government-
sponsored idea formulated to provide better facilities to IDPs. This took into 
consideration the time required for de-mining and the monsoon season, which was 
expected within months, while providing basic infrastructure—all of which required 
extensive effort.75  
International stakeholders refused to fund the welfare villages because they saw 
them as internment camps.76 This prevented much-needed planning assistance from the 
international community. However, the GoSL was determined to implement its plan, 
despite financial and resource difficulties. The GoSL identified an area in Vavuniya 
district to house IDPs: Manik Farm, located southwest of Vavuniya, with access to water. 
The ministry of resettlement was tasked to prepare necessary temporary accommodations 
with basic facilities, including education, to accommodate 24,000 families at three relief 
villages.77 Due to a shortage of resources and capacity at the national and provisional 
level, the GoSL experienced difficulties in the construction of welfare villages. Thus, 
even as the conflict raged, the Sri Lankan Army was tasked late in 2008 to carry out 
jungle clearance, road construction, and temporary sheltering of welfare villages.  
This advance planning paid off as more than 230,000 internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) crossed over to government-controlled areas during the final month of the 
conflict, in addition to the 65,000 IDPs who crossed over before May 2009.78  The 
ministries of resettlement and disaster relief services, economic development, child 
development and women’s affairs, public administration and home affairs, social 
services, disaster management and human rights, finance and planning, and nation 
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building and state infrastructure development were involved in the reconstruction. This 
led to an overlapping of governmental responsibilities and coordination difficulties.  
A national steering committee was appointed to supervise and coordinate the 
management of welfare villages.79 At the national level, the minister of resettlement 
disaster-relief services represented a steering committee, which included representatives 
from the relevant ministries, such as personnel from the ministry of defense, country 
representatives of UN agencies, and a consortium of humanitarian agencies.80 A district 
committee was appointed initially with representation from the government agent, chief 
coordinator, IDP affairs, UN agencies, local government departments and agencies, and 
INGOs and NGOs. Soon afterwards, the GoSL appointed the chief of staff of the army as 
competent authority for the north, and, upon his retirement, appointed the commander of 
security-force headquarters, Wanni (commander, north-central area) to coordinate and 
expedite the process and serve on the district steering committee. This appointment 
highlighted the difficulties faced by the government in the IDP centers and sought to 
expedite the resettlement process by coordinating government institutions.     
On 14 May 2009, the GoSL appointed a very high-powered presidential task 
force (PTF) for resettlement, development, and security in Northern Province,81 
consisting of nineteen members, including chief-of-defense staff, the commanders of the 
army, navy, and air force, the inspector-general of police, the director-general, the 
department of civil-defense force, the chief of staff of the Sri Lankan army, and the 
competent authority for Northern Province.82 The then-senior presidential advisor and 
present minister of economic development was appointed chairman of the task force.83 
Members of the presidential task force were senior government officials in institutions 
responsible for reconstruction and resettlement. The inclusion of five top-ranking military 
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members in the task force was the first indication of the government’s intention to use the 
military in reconstruction.  Furthermore, it was an indication that the government planned 
to carry out post-conflict reconstruction under a centralized approach.  
The primary intention of the GoSL in establishing a PTF was to resettle “families 
in their places of origin, providing better facilities than they enjoyed when they left their 
villages.”84 Though the GoSL established the PTF for reconstruction and resettlement in 
Northern Province, it had separate ministries for the same purpose. To achieve its 
intention, the PTF was tasked with formulating and implementing a strategic “framework 
for rapid resettlement and recovery program, to formulate and implement a strategic plan 
and road map for accelerated demining and improvement of infrastructure facilities and 
to assess damages and resources requirement.” The PTF implemented these assigned 
tasks by “mobilizing skills and resources of the government construction agencies;” by 
pooling resources under the central, provisional “government agencies and projects;” and 
by obtaining additional resources through donors.85 Furthermore, the PTF decided to 
obtain the “active participation of security forces in humanitarian activities.”86  
Irrespective of all this commitment, the GoSL continued to adapt the 
precautionary measures that were in place before the defeat of the LTTE. This was due to 
the weapons training that had been given by the LTTE to all inhabitants “between [the 
ages of] 18 and 45” in LTTE-controlled areas. The GoSL attempted to anticipate any 
threat from an isolated fraction of LTTE, 87 and was very cautious in screening IDPs to 
identify ex-combatants. Due to security issues, and in consideration of the safety of IDPs 
exposed to the extensive use of mines and IEDs in former LTTE areas, the GoSL directed 
IDPs to IDP centers, which were prepared with the assistance of the military. Before 
allowing IDPs to return home, the government initiated an immediate action plan to 
conduct humanitarian de-mining per the priorities worked out by United Nations agencies 
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and Tamil civil servants in the affected areas.  The GoSL immediately came under 
international criticism over the “detentions of thousands of persons in camps,”88 even 
though the GoSL provided them with basic needs.89 The international community argued 
that, “overcrowding, limited water and sanitary facilities, lack of healthcare, restrictions 
on humanitarian access, and lack of coordination among government” institutions are 
“having grave consequences in the lives and dignity of the IDPs.”90 Though the GoSL 
intention was to carry out resettlement “based on the speed at which the de-mining 
process takes place,”91 it had to expedite resettlement due to international pressure. 
Against this backdrop, the GoSL “put forward a 180-day plan to resettle all the IDPs.”92 
Acceleration of any project needs immediate capital and additional resources. The 
GoSL’s decision to accelerate resettlement forced the dedication of additional resources 
for de-mining, repair, and improvement to damaged infrastructure in former LTTE-held 
areas. The acceleration of resettlement further motivated the GoSL to look for 
alternatives, due to shortages of resources within the government.  
Post-conflict reconstruction required advanced planning for proper 
implementation and sustainability. The GoSL’s “Mahinda Chintana: Vision for a New Sri 
Lanka,” became President Rajapaksa’s election manifesto for the 2005 presidential 
election as the primary ten-year strategic plan for development of Sri Lanka.93  Though 
its 2005 edition had been published before the commencement of humanitarian 
operations, it gave the required guidelines for development activities in Northern 
Province, even though Northern Province was under the control of the LTTE at that time. 
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However, the 2010 edition deliberately describes reconstruction in Northern 
Province under the “Uturu Wasanthaya” program. Though Mahinda Chintana is designed 
to address entire national issues and intended for future national development projects, it 
provides detailed descriptions of a variety of tasks that were intended to be carried out in 
support of post-conflict reconstruction, including reconstruction, resettlement, 
reintegration, livelihood development through agricultural incentives, support of the 
fishing industry and animal husbandry, and welfare projects.94  
Having identified the demanding tasks within the resettlement process, the GoSL 
set it priorities. The GoSL undertook the most essential tasks, such as the preparation of a 
master plan, “de-mining, restoration of infrastructure, and reestablishment of delivery 
mechanisms” in the initial stage.95  Furthermore, the GoSL initiated a mechanism to 
grant Rs 325,000 ($2,825) on a long-term basis to reconstruct houses destroyed during 
the conflict; Rs 100,000 ($870) to renovate houses and for construction of sanitary 
facilities, and Rs 50,000 ($435) for construction of temporary shelters and building 
materials worth Rs 50.000 ($435).96 However, since resettlement started, civil 
administration and services in the newly liberated areas have not been properly 
established. Therefore, returning families found it difficult to renovate or repair their 
damaged houses. Furthermore, the GoSL faced difficulties in coordinating its support 
mechanisms at the lower levels. Since the GoSL’s intention is to provide better facilities 
to returnees, it was considering the options available.    
The GoSL also identified the importance of providing assistance for income 
generation after resettlement, and initiated a program to provide agricultural equipment 
such as water pumps and tractors to families engaged in agrarian activities, as well as 
“seeds and fertilizer relevant to the crops cultivated by them.”97  For the fishing industry, 
free fishing equipment is to be provided and fish-processing centers to be established at 
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Mannar and Jaffna in Northern Province.98  To promote animal husbandry, free 
equipment and chicks will be “provided for the poultry industry” and villages of dairy 
farmers “established to promote the dairy industry.”99  Those who wish to engage in self-
employment will be provided with the necessary equipment free of charge.100 However, 
to implement these tasks, reestablished provisional government institutions in newly 
liberated areas have been short of resources.101 Meanwhile, the government too, has been 
short of resources to implement all these activities at once. To ease the difficulties faced 
by returning families, the central bank of Sri Lanka has encouraged all government and 
private banks to provide loans to IDPs who are willing and capable of starting small 
enterprises and to those who seek housing loans, irrespective of their ability to provide 
security to the bank. The central bank of Sri Lanka has assured all other banks that it will 
back the loans and pay the fees if banks face any difficulty recovering loans.102  
With these measures in place, the GoSL managed to resettle all IDPs except seven 
thousand, providing most with livelihood opportunities. At the same time, the GoSL has 
identified the importance of a continuing commitment to helping people in Northern 
Province recover and rebuild their lives, so as to achieve sustainable development and 
peace. The government, in consultation with United Nations agencies and other 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), formulated a joint plan for assistance (JPA) for Northern Province 
in 2011 to identify priority activities to help people “recover, rebuild, and return to 
normal life” and achieve long-term, sustainable development “within the shortest time 
frame possible.”103 Guidelines for JPA have been initiated by the PTF to ensure that 
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people get more assistance, consistent with the government plan.104 For year 2012, GoSL 
has already allocated ten-billion rupees for northern development.105 
C. DEVASTATION IN NORTHERN PROVINCE 
Institutions are the key elements in post-conflict reconstruction. Before its defeat, 
the LTTE controlled approximately one third of the Sri Lankan land area and two thirds 
of the coastal area, within a de facto state (the LTTE had their own administration in 
place). Though provisional government institutions were functional in LTTE-controlled 
areas, officials were under the grip of the LTTE, and therefore these institutions were 
functioning at low key. Furthermore, they were hampered as the fighting intensified in its 
final stages. However, these provisional institutions managed to coordinate the 
humanitarian aid sent to LTTE-controlled areas with the help of international 
organizations such as the Red Cross and United Nations.106 After the defeat of the LTTE 
in 2009, the GoSL reestablished provisional government institutions in the newly 
liberated areas with the same officials and bureaucrats who held the post during the 
conflict. Reestablishment of provisional government in newly liberated areas was delayed 
for a considerable time due to the extreme devastation to infrastructure and concern over 
mines in the area. The non-existence of provisional government institutions in newly 
liberated areas where resettlement and reconstruction were needed forced the GoSL to 
consider other alternatives.    
Northern Province, which was under LTTE control for more than two decades, 
was one of the most underdeveloped provinces in Sri Lanka. Though the GoSL invested 
on infrastructure projects in LTTE-controlled areas during the time of the conflict, there 
was little significant development in Northern Province. Furthermore, “heavy fighting 
during the last phases of the war essentially destroyed much of the north.”107 Almost all 
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irrigation systems in Northern Province were destroyed, due to series of defense lines 
constructed by the LTTE that incorporated irrigation canals. LTTE had used most of the 
roofing sheets in households for defense construction. Most of the roads were cratered 
and mined to prevent the advance of the Sri Lankan army. It was estimated that more 
than 1.5 million mines were placed “in the Northern Province, an area of 3,340 square 
miles,” by the LTTE and the army.108 Most of the agricultural lands were not cultivated 
for a long period, due to damages to the irrigation system or presence of mines. This 
devastation spurred the use of the military for reconstruction in Northern Province, 
especially since the military had an advantage over civilian authority in the aftermath of 
the war, due to their presence on the ground and local knowledge about accessible areas. 
D. REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION       
Though demobilizing former combatants and their reintegration into society is a 
complicated process, the GoSL has taken positive steps to achieve the desired end state, 
facing both political and logistical challenges due to the large number of surrendered or 
captured ex-combatants (officially tallied at 11,696)109 The start of rehabilitation was 
delayed two months after the surrender due to logistical problems, challenges associated 
with legal registration of ex-combatants, separating combatants from IDPs, and 
appointing a commissioner-general of rehabilitation under the ministry of rehabilitation 
and prison reforms, tasked with overseeing the effort to rehabilitate and reintegrate 
former LTTE fighters. The GoSL appointed a senior army officer (a major general) as 
commissioner-general of rehabilitation. The initial challenges faced by the authorities 
included a need to gain the trust of ex-combatants who had been brainwashed by LTTE 
leadership and trained to use cyanide capsules in case of arrest. Many ex-combatants had 
lived their entire lives with the LTTE.  
The rehabilitation program started on October 1, 2009, after the regrouping of all 
ex-combatants and establishment of twenty-four protective accommodations and 
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rehabilitation centers in the north and east.110 Ex-combatants were given the choice either 
to continue with formal education or pursue vocational training.111 Child soldiers were 
separated from other combatants and rehabilitated under the supervision of the UNHCR 
before being handed over to their parents.112 Two hundred and ninety-three children 
opted to continue with formal education and enrolled at Hindu College, Colombo. James 
Elder, a spokesman for UNICEF in Sri Lanka, calls the process a “genuine attempt to 
help child soldiers learn how to be civilians.”113 Vocational training in various fields has 
been conducted mainly with local assistance.114 The government has faced a difficulty in 
providing direct employment, since it has no intention of enlisting them as security 
forces, though it has identified a need to provide livelihoods for reintegrated ex-
combatants. With the GoSL appeal, Sri Lanka’s private sector has shown a greater 
commitment by offering ex-combatants suitable employment in enterprises in former 
war-torn areas and absorbing them into existing industries in the south.115 However, 
considerable numbers of ex-combatants remained unemployed. Therefore, at the 
beginning of 2012, GoSL offered ex-combatants opportunities to join the police if they 
meet educational qualifications.116 
Furthermore, the GoSL with the assistance of international community has 
planned to distribute necessary equipment to ex-combatants who opt for self-
employment.117 International Organization of Migration (IOM) studies have revealed that 
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vocational training has not only benefited ex-combatants, it can be beneficial to whole 
families and villages as well. However, while parents are allowed to visit, the 
international community has not been given access to ex-combatants. Most of the ex-
combatants who have been released are either less involved or conscripted cadres. The 
government has initiated legal action against nearly a thousand hardcore ex-combatants 
while releasing the remainder.118 The government of Sri Lanka spent Rs 1.8 billion for 
the first year of the rehabilitation process, while spending Rs 64.5 million per month 
presently.119 The government has initiated a program to monitor the progress of 
reintegrating ex-combatants into society, and the military is heavily involved in this 
process.120 Though the GoSL intended to distribute the equipment required for self-
employment, this program has not been properly implemented, due to a shortage of 
resources.  However, none of the reintegrated cadres has yet been involved in mischief or 
arrested by the police.121 Meanwhile, the former political arm of the LTTE, the Tamil 
National Alliance (TNA), who won the most seats in formerly LTTE-held areas during 
first-ever elections held after the defeat of the LTTE, has praised the GoSL for its 
genuine effort in the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants.122  
E. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
The presence of INGOs in Sri Lanka can be traced back to the early stages of the 
conflict in Sri Lanka. Over 1,350 INGOs, 45 local NGOs, and 11 United Nation agencies 
are presently working in partnership to reconstruct Northern Province.123 Most of the 
INGOs had their presence in government-controlled areas, as well as in some LTTE-held 
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areas. Due to prolonged operations under demanding conditions in LTTE areas, queries 
on several projects undertaken by INGOs in these areas were not answered by the 
INGO.124 The GoSL gradually was able to understand the helplessness of INGOs 
operating in LTTE-controlled areas. However, INGOs’s involvement in certain incidents 
that threatened the national security and image of the country developed mistrust between 
the government, INGOs, and NGOs. 
INGO involvement in the extreme devastation suffered after the tsunami further 
strengthened the requirement of streamlining the process.125 These conditions finally led 
the GoSL to implement controlled measures on INGO and NGO operations in Sri Lanka 
and to ask a number of United Nations and INGOs officials to leave the country, 
especially during the period of the Norwegian-facilitated ceasefire and during the final 
phase of operations.126 The GoSL strictly insisted that all INGOs and NGOs should 
register with the NGO secretariat and be linked “to the line ministry” to provide 
identified projects in line with national policy and priorities.127 INGOs then sign a 
memorandum of understanding with a particular line ministry, including scope, 
geographical location, and subject matter.128    
With this background, the co-chairs to the Norwegian-facilitated peace process—
Japan, the United States, the European Union and Norway—highlighted the imperative of 
institutionalizing a consultative committee to the GoSL. With these developments, the 
GoSL established the consultative committee on humanitarian assistance (CCHA) in 
September 2006. CCHA facilitated bringing together all relevant state actors; selected 
donors such as Japan, the United States, the European Union and Norway; and UN 
agencies, INGOs, and NGOs providing opportunities for group effort and collective 
decision making in providing humanitarian assistance.129  
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This has helped stakeholders ensure transparency and accountability in humanitarian and 
development work carried out in Sri Lanka. 
Once the government offensive against the LTTE escalated and government 
forces started regaining areas under LTTE control, neither the GoSL nor INGOs 
envisioned that the LTTE would take the entire population hostage, preventing them from 
crossing over to government-controlled areas.130 However, UN agencies such as WFP, 
WHO, and the ICRC, which were operating in LTTE areas, were instrumental in 
providing essential services such as food and healthcare, with the assistance of low-key  
government servants in LTTE-controlled areas. For getting required supplies to civilians 
and ensuring that the supplies were speedily channeled, the GoSL set up a “special 
logistic hub” in Vavuniya—the northernmost main city in the government-controlled 
areas—with the assistance of WFP and the UN.131 The hub has the capacity to store 
“5000 metric tons of food and non-food items.” 132  Meanwhile, once the conflict came to 
its final stages, the concern of most of the INGOs and NGOs was to provide immediate 
humanitarian assistance, emergency supplies, and return assistance to IDPs, rather than to 
concentrate on domains of reconstruction, income generation, and reconciliation. Even 
the senior program officer of UNHCR warned all humanitarian agencies to provide all 
the assistance that they could to IDPs in January 2009.133     
With this background, the UNHCR estimated that 40,000 IDPs will arrive in 
Jaffna, “30,000 in Mannar and 50,000 in Vavuniya,” and encouraged humanitarian 
agencies to use this figure as an initial guideline for planning. 134 INGOs have come 
across two main obstacles in planning their operations. First, difficulty in identifying sites 
in areas other than Vavuniya; and secondly, they have been given only restricted access 
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to the IDP camps in Mannar and Vavuniya.135 When the large influx of IDPs started to 
arrive, INGO and NGO supported the government in their capacity to provide 
humanitarian assistance, despite their disagreement over housing them in IDP centers. 
The GoSL firmly believes that projects that INGOs and NGOs undertake will not 
have a bearing on the targeted people if those organizations cannot sustain the project in 
parallel with the service of the GoSL.136 Therefore, the GoSL is reluctant to approve 
projects unless INGOs and NGOs have the capacity and funding to work with the GoSL. 
The Asian Development Bank argues that “contribution of NGOs to development in Sri 
Lanka has varied over the past several years” and “some are facing significant capacity 
issues.”137 These conditions, along with funding shortages due to the Sri Lankan 
elevation from developing country to middle-income-country status soon after the 
conflict ended, have caused many INGOS to close their operations in Sri Lanka.138  
In 2009, INGO and NGO activities were centered on welfare villages, due to mine 
risks and concern over the presence of hidden LTTE-weapons caches, even though there 
was a requirement to develop infrastructure facilities in newly liberated areas.139 
Therefore, since the end of hostilities, the United Nations and its agencies, as well as 
INGOs, and NGOs, have supported the GoSL in meeting the basic requirement of IDPs 
in “welfare centers.” INGOs and NGOs have supported welfare villages by site planning 
and preparation, establishment of drainage, provision of food, and maintenance of shelter 
systems.140 Since May 2009, United Nations agencies and INGOs and NGOs have 
focused on shelter provision and non-food item assistance, food for IDPs, maintaining a 
dependable supply of drinking and raw water to IDPs, “repair and maintenance of 
WASH-related services,” provision of medical equipment and support to the ministry of 
health to maintain medical facilities in welfare centers, assistance to the education 
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ministry to establish schools within IDP centers, and provision of basic educational 
materials to children in welfare centers. However, INGOs and NGOs who were involved 
in de-mining continued their operations in newly liberated areas. 
Once the resettlement process picked up, in correlation with the speed of de-
mining, the United Nations and other partner organizations provided “assistance aimed at 
supporting the reestablishment of services and livelihood in support of government 
efforts.”141 However, all the program and projects have to be approved by the PTF before 
implementation.142 This facilitated the INGO contribution to resettlement and 
development programs in Northern Province’s being generated at the lowest level by the 
“divisional secretariat with the participation of communities” in identifying basic 
needs.143 With this mechanism in place, INGOs contribution to resettlement and 
reconstruction was initiated.  
INGOs and NGOs are instrumental in filling the gaps in the government 
resettlement and reconstruction plan. WFP has initiated actions to provide food for 
returnee families, help IDPs live with host families, and build collaboration with 
government multipurpose cooperative societies for food distribution.144 “Each returning 
family gets Rs 25,000 ($216) from the U.N. high commissioner for refugees and food 
rations for six months from the World Food Program.”145 To support the transition of 
IDPs to their native places, WFP has initiated food-for-work (FFW), food-for-training 
(FFT), and food-for-assets (FFA) programs in Northern Province.146 INGOs, in 
collaboration with the ministry of agriculture, have provided assistance such as “paddy 
and other food crops, vegetable seeds, fertilizer, basic agriculture tools, and barbed-wire 
rolls to support agriculture and animal husbandry.”147 Assistance has been provided to 
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government-service providers to overcome transport shortages.148 INGOs have supported 
livelihood programs such as “agriculture, livestock, employment promotion, micro-
enterprises development, skill training, business promotion, marketing and fishery” to 
support the returning IDPs.149 INGOs have also initiated projects and programs in the 
fields of water and sanitation, education, health and nutrition, civil administration, and a 
national protection mechanism and in-mine action.150  Though the GoSL intended to 
monitor the activities of INGOs and NGOs, it has faced difficulties in monitoring their 
field activities in newly liberated areas, due to a shortage of resources within provisional 
governmental institutions. Therefore, the GoSL needed an effective mechanism to 
monitor the field activities of INGOs and NGOs. 
F. CONCLUSION 
As the conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE drew to a close 
in 2009, Colombo was forced to confront a complex post-conflict security situation that 
combined large numbers of IDPs and surrendered or captured cadres with a requirement 
to rehabilitate the extremely devastated Northern Province. The efforts to realize this 
mission was complicated by several factors, beginning with the need to deal with a 
growing refugee crisis (which was complicated by the fact that former fighters were 
mixed in with civilian refugees). Disagreements over how to balance the government’s 
security concerns with the need to process and resettle hundreds of thousands of IDPs 
strained relations between the international donor community and the GoSL, which had 
complicated, and sometimes slowed, reconstruction and reintegration efforts.  Resources 
that had already been depleted by the reconstruction of Eastern Province before the 
liberation of Northern Province were further taxed by a proliferation of central and 
provincial government bureaucracies, agencies, and commissions with confused and 
overlapping responsibilities that made coordination difficult. Finally, the extreme 
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devastation of Northern Province and the presence of mines and improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) have made it dangerous for people to return to their homes. 
After identifying all these challenges, the GoSL put forward a mechanism that 
was opposed by the international community. This opposition prevented much-needed 
assistance in the initial stages. Despite the international community’s opposition, the 
GoSL determined to implement its plan. Coordination difficulties, overlapping 
responsibilities among governmental institutions, and lack of resources within the 
government prevented the GoSL from implementing desired strategies. Furthermore, the 
accelerated resettlement program put forward by the GoSL further weakened the 
government’s ability to face the challenges of reconstructing Northern Province. 
Therefore, the GoSL had to use its military capabilities to fill gaps in the government 
mechanism. By doing so, the GoSL was able to resettle over two hundred and eighty-five 
thousand IDPs (97% of the total) by the end of 2011, and to provide them with 
infrastructure facilities and livelihood opportunities. In the field of rehabilitation and 
reintegration, the GOSL reintegrated all ex-combatants except one thousand, who are 
under detention. Even with these achievements, the government believes that continuing 
commitment is required to further upgrade facilities provided to returnees. With that 
intention, GoSL has allocated Rs. 12.0 billion for development projects in Northern 
Province in the year 2012. 
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III. THE ROLE OF THE SRI LANKAN MILITARY IN POST-
CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 
This chapter examines how the military used its capabilities to shape the overall 
reconstruction process put forward by the GoSL. This investigation will examine what 
enabled the military to perform post-conflict reconstruction successfully, as well as what 
role the military plays in the process of reconstruction in the absence of a formal peace 
accord. It will also examine what military capabilities have been used in reconstruction, 
whether the military needs to redefine its missions in the present environment, and 
finally, whether the military’s capacity will undermine the state’s capacity. 
While doing so, this chapter will argue that the government’s decision to use the 
military for post-conflict reconstruction has improved its response to resettlement, 
reconstruction, and reintegration. Furthermore, this chapter argues that the use of the 
military to improve state capacity in infrastructure development has not diminished the 
military’s warmaking capabilities.  
A. SRI LANKAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN NATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT, DISASTER RESPONSE, AND CIVIL 
ADMINISTRATION 
Prior training on projects related to reconstruction is required to carry out an 
effective and efficient contribution to post-conflict reconstruction. Since Sri Lanka is a 
developing country, resources for national development are limited; therefore, the Sri 
Lankan military has been mobilized to carry out national development projects. Some of 
the functions the military is trained to carry out during wartime have been used for 
nation-building projects such as the construction of airfields, stadiums, pavilions, bridges, 
roads, causeways, culverts, schools, playgrounds, and water tanks for agriculture and 
canals. The army has also installed underground cables and manholes, and designed and 
constructed infrastructure and earthworks for national infrastructure-development 
projects, including dams. It has also performed jungle clearing for new settlements and 
cultivation under “Mahaweli Development” and builds housing units.151  
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While the Sri Lankan navy and air force participated in national development 
projects such as roads, their contributions have been minimal, due to limited numbers and 
capabilities. The navy and air force are instrumental in relief operations during natural 
disasters, which Sri Lanka too frequently experiences. In addition to responding to 
frequent flash floods, the military was heavily involved in reconstruction and relief 
operations following the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which devastated coastal 
areas and took more than 40,000 lives.152  
These military contributions to national development continued even during the 
conflict, during which military engineers were involved in national-development projects 
in north-central, central, and western Sri Lanka. Contributions to nation-building projects, 
post-tsunami reconstruction, and the construction of roads and bridges in the Eastern 
Province have given the military the hands-on experience required to support post-
conflict reconstruction following the end of hostilities.  
Immediately after the conflict, provisional governmental institutions in former 
LTTE-held areas were not functioning. The decision to speed up resettlement, along with 
international pressure, required that the GoSL reestablish civilian administration in 
formerly LTTE-held areas.153 Damaged infrastructure and safety concerns due to 
extensive use of mines and IEDs, along with requirements to unearth hidden LTTE 
weapon catches, however, prevented immediate re-establishment of provisional 
government institutions in former LTTE-held areas. Therefore, the only option available 
for the GoSL was to use the military for administration in support of resettlement and 
reconstruction until the establishment of provisional civil administration. This allowed 
the GoSL to expedite resettlement and reconstruction in formerly LTTE-held areas.    
The military’s role in government-aid administration is hardly new. Samuel Finer 
argues that “in less developed economies, it is easier for military to function as 
                                                 
152 Marion Hughes, “Sri Lanka’s Armed Forces at the Heart of the Tsunami Relief Effort,” 
Peacekeeping English Project, British Council, Issue 18, April 2005,  
http://www.britishcouncil.org/pep18.pdf (accessed January 11. 2011). 
153 Hilary Rajakarunanayake, “Government working on a plan to resettle IDPs within 180 days—Sri 
Lanka President,” Asia Tribune, May 24, 2009,  http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/17869 (accessed 
December 23, 2011).   
  39 
administrators.”154 Finer claims that this is possible due to military “superiority in 
organization, high emotionalized symbolic status, and monopoly of arms.”155 In Sri 
Lanka during the 1988–90 JVP insurrection, the government appointed military officers 
as civil administrators in conflict-plagued districts where the provisional civil 
administration could not function. Most of the officers who served during this period are 
still in active service. In addition, the military served as administrators in villages that 
bordered on conflict zones. Furthermore, conditions in the Northern Province, such as 
underdevelopment, unsafe conditions, and the need for a mechanism to support GoSL 
resettlement and reconstruction, found the military occupying administrative functions in 
support of reconstruction and resettlement, even though not fully trained to function as 
administrators. 
B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ABSENCE OF A PEACE ACCORD 
The total defeat of the LTTE in 2009 has facilitated military-led reconstruction. 
Cristina Steenkamp argues that peace accords “often do not bring about a real and lasting 
end to violence.”156 Post-conflict violence can erupt due to misunderstandings between 
the signatories of the peace accord or because terms may be unacceptable to factions 
within the parties to the agreement; following the end of the Maoist insurgency, Nepal 
experienced a similar situation. Furthermore, the actors who signed the peace accord may 
try to retain their arms, in violation of the accord. Third-party brokers who try to disarm 
them may encounter violence. This was the case in Sri Lanka following the 1987 Indo–
Lankan peace accord, when the LTTE refused to hand over its weapons as agreed and 
instead returned to violence.157 Florence Gaub argues that 43.6 percent of countries 
return to violence in the first five years following a conflict.158 Of course, DDR in a 
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formal sense has not been a problem in Sri Lanka, though concerns remain that former 
LTTE combatants merged with IDPs and escaped to the south, leaving behind hidden 
arms caches. So far, however, fears of renewed violence have failed to materialize in the 
aftermath of the LTTE’s crushing defeat.  
The absences of a peace accord and post-conflict violence have facilitated speedy 
implementation of reconstruction in Sri Lanka. Cristina Steenkamp argues that “post-
accord violence holds serious implications for the reconstruction of the state.”159 
Whether or not there is a peace accord, violence can inhibit implementation of a 
reconstruction process. Even though parties signed the peace accord, they may not be 
able to develop a clear understanding of implementation of reconstructive strategies, due 
to lingering, persistent mistrust. This will delay the implementation of reconstruction and 
prevent benefits from flowing to the affected population. Furthermore, violence and 
uncertainty can distract the international community and discourage donors prepared to 
support post-conflict reconstruction. Notably, a peace accord may encourage a non-state 
actor to object to the military presence in reconstruction. It can severely affect a 
government’s ability to implement reconstruction through civilian agencies or INGOs, 
which may fall victim to violence or intimidation.  INGOs require considerable time to 
acquire the funds needed to support reconstruction. The nonexistence of a peace accord in 
Sri Lanka has helped the GoSL ensure security throughout the country—especially in the 
Northern Province—and focus the military immediately on reconstruction and 
reintegration. 
C. ROLE PLAYED BY THE SRI LANKAN MILITARY IN POST-
CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 
The military contribution to post-conflict reconstruction began immediately after 
the rescue of civilians from the LTTE’s grip. At the very end of the conflict, the LTTE 
forcibly took the entire civilian population living in formerly LTTE-controlled areas to a 
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tiny stretch of land as LTTE-controlled areas contracted.160 This caused the Sri Lankan 
commanders to slow the tempo of military operations in an attempt to save the lives of 
civilian hostages. The LTTE constrained, punished, or killed civilians who tried to cross 
over to government-controlled areas, despite requests made by the government and 
international community.161 Although the international community and GoSL criticized 
the LTTE action, no remedies were available to rescue civilians from their grip. 
Furthermore, the LTTE used civilians as human shields, to construct defensive positions 
and carry out other actions to support their war effort.162 Therefore, although much 
criticized, the military had no choice but to pursue operations to rescue civilians.  
The military had to plan rescues carefully, with special emphasis on minimizing 
civilian casualties while engaging the terrorists militarily. Large numbers of security 
personnel sacrificed their lives in attempts to rescue civilians. LTTE suicide cadres 
disguised as civilians crossed over to government-controlled areas and blew themselves 
up, killing civilians, including children and soldiers who assisted civilians.163 These 
circumstances compelled the GoSL to implement security measures, even after the defeat 
of the LTTE, until all possible ex-combatants were apprehended. Thus, although the 
military was actively involved in post-conflict reconstruction, the majority of security 
personnel were engaged in their classic security role.    
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As the military witnessed the hardships that civilians had undergone during the 
final part of the conflict, the military devoted themselves, as far as security duties 
allowed, to providing humanitarian assistance. Civil administration had not yet been 
restored; thus the military was tasked to handle all civilians able to cross over to 
government-controlled areas. It was solely the Sri Lanka military, especially the army, 
hat received the civilians and understood most fully the hardships they had undergone at 
the hands of the LTTE. Civilians crossed to government-controlled areas with only those 
possessions they could carry, many of them assisting the elderly, children, sick, and 
wounded. 
Military assistance to civilians transiting to IDP centers helped to develop trust 
between civilians and the military. Some required immediate medical assistance. Most 
were without food and water. The military initially donated their own food rations until 
the GoSL arranged meals for IDPs. All those who required immediate medical assistance 
were taken care of by military medical teams attached to fighting formations.164 The 
military’s casualty-evacuation equipment, such as helicopters and military ambulances, 
were used to evacuate pregnant mothers, elders, and wounded civilians to civilian 
medical facilities—especially to the Vavuniya, Anuradapura, and Trincomalee general 
hospitals.165  Civilians’s basic needs were looked after by the military until they 
transferred to welfare villages especially prepared for them.166 The immediate provision 
of military humanitarian assistance jumpstarted the first step of winning the hearts and 
minds of civilians, while the military was filling the gap in the government reconstruction 
process.  
To face the unexpected deluge of IDPs, the GoSL appointed the army chief of 
staff as a competent authority and, upon his retirement, replaced him with the commander 
of security-force headquarters, Wanni (commander of Security Force North Central).167  
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Though the government identified its obligations to IDPs, GoSL plans to house them in 
welfare villages were based on figures that proved to be desperately underestimated. The 
large influx of IDPs strained government resources. Most INGOs and the international 
community concluded that the GoSL was incapable of handling the situation, which was 
developing into a humanitarian crisis.168  
The competent authority was entrusted with the “provision of all essential 
facilities to the persons of Northern Province who are displaced and for the 
administration and operation within Northern Province.”169 He carried out this assigned 
task by coordinating government institutions, agencies, and the military while obtaining 
support from INGOs. The newly appointed competent authority used the military for 
speedy construction of additional IDP centers. Tasks entrusted to the military, especially 
the army, included selecting suitable ground for construction of new welfare villages and 
earthworks, jungle clearance, construction of an interior road network and temporary 
drainage system, digging of toilet pits, and erection of temporary shelters. Such actions 
taken by the military prevented the humanitarian crisis predicted by the international 
community and INGOs. Later Neil Buhne, UN resident coordinator for Sri Lanka, 
praised the GoSL for this accomplishment.170   
Appointment of the chief of staff of the army as the competent authority in the 
Northern Province not only facilitated the provision of basic humanitarian needs and the 
overcoming of the crisis, but also the implementation of a government strategy. While 
establishing additional IDP centers, the competent authority had taken steps to provide 
IDP centers with banking facilities, postal services, electricity, communication facilities 
with international direct dialing, satellite television, schools, healthcare and medical 
centers, vocational training, shops and markets, and entertainment. Although active-duty 
military assisted the administration of welfare villages at the beginning, they were later 
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restricted to the periphery of IDP centers. For efficient handling of IDP centers, retired 
army officers and enlisted persons were mobilized through the ministry of resettlement to 
administer welfare villages. Their salaries were paid by the UNHCR. Appointment of a 
senior military officer as a competent authority helped GoSL coordinate the speedy 
provision of humanitarian assistance to IDPs and to use the military to construct welfare 
villages in an efficient, coordinated manner—which helped overcome the shortage of 
resources and coordination difficulties within the GoSL. 
The presence of service officers with the most seniority in the PTF (the 
presidential task force for resettlement, development, and security in the Northern 
Province, empowered to formulate and implement the strategy for post-conflict 
reconstruction) helped the GoSL to coordinate its program and use the military at the 
highest level. Though individual responsibilities entrusted to PTF members were not 
evident, members of the PTF have taken part in the formulation and implementation of 
the strategic plan by contributing and coordinating institutional capacity.  Therefore, it is 
evident that activities carried out by the military at the operational and tactical level for 
reconstruction, resettlement, and reintegration have guidance and instruction from the 
highest level of command.   
Identifying ex-combatants, disarming them, and separating them from civilians 
helps to establish sustainable peace. One of the primary tasks the military carried out 
after rescuing civilians was identification of the ex-combatants who had merged with 
IDPs. Some LTTE cadres surrendered to military units voluntarily after crossing over to 
government-controlled areas.171 The military took steps to register the ex-combatants in 
the presence of the ICRC and representatives of the GoSL.172  Identification of other ex-
combatants, merged with IDPs, was an uphill task, complicated by limited intelligence. 
This was later overcome by captured LTTE documents, informants, and IDPs who 
volunteered to provide information about the ex-combatants among them. In this way, 
more than 3,000 ex-LTTE cadres who had merged with IDPs were arrested during the 
first three months.  Immediate steps were taken to separate them from IDPs and house 
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them separately under adequate security. Actions taken by the military at the outset have 
helped immensely to change the perception of ex-combatants who were “indoctrinated 
with vicious stories of the security forces and had developed hatred towards the 
military.”173 Furthermore, ex-combatants helped military units identify and apprehend 
LTTE cadres who had escaped arrest or surrender. Still, a considerable number of ex-
combatants are at large, especially in foreign countries. The military commitment to 
apprehend former LTTE cadres helped the GoSL maintain law and order, which in turn 
improved the immediate GoSL response to post-conflict reconstruction in the Northern 
Province. 
Rehabilitation and the successful reintegration into society—with a livelihood—is 
required to prevent ex-combatants from resorting to violence again. To carry out this 
complicated process, GoSL appointed a major general from the Sri Lankan army as the 
commissioner general of rehabilitation, whose task was to recognize the degree of   
participation of the individual ex-combatants in the conflict and to design and institute a 
rehabilitation program before re-integrating them into society.174 The commissioner 
general initiated a program to change the perception of the indoctrinated ex-combatants 
during the period of rehabilitation, which included “vocational training and de-
radicalization, including spiritual learning and meditation.”175 The commissioner general 
of rehabilitation was again instrumental in seeking a livelihood for ex-combatants upon 
their rehabilitation.  
Though many civilians were involved in the process, the military was more focused 
towards the day-to-day handling of ex-combatants, though it occasionally provided 
vocational training during the period of rehabilitation. 
While the military was less engaged in rehabilitation, it was heavily involved in 
reintegration, starting once the rehabilitated ex-combatant was reintegrated to the society. 
The military involvement in reintegration was twofold. Its first concern was security. 
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Second, the military assisted the reintegrated ex-combatants in finding livelihood 
opportunities. Soon after reintegration, respective military headquarters and police were 
informed about the release of rehabilitated ex-combatants by the bureau of the 
commissioner general.176 The military carries out regular monitoring of reintegrated ex-
combatants to prevent them from resorting to terrorist activities and to monitor the 
progress of reintegration. Though the GoSL has taken many steps to find suitable 
employment for ex-combatants, a considerable number remain unemployed.177 
Therefore, the military helps reintegrated ex-combatants find employment, either by 
helping them find work or providing equipment, capital, and advice to start self-
employment.178 The military finds suitable donors and coordinates the process either 
with the support of personal donations or by personnel.  
The development of infrastructure, along with security, has contributed to stability 
and helped to transform a fragile peace into lasting peace. Viable physical infrastructure 
is essential for the development of the economy. If the infrastructure is damaged or 
destroyed, economic development will stagnate and may lead to crime, violence, and 
political discontent. The military was instrumental in providing adequate security to the 
country as a whole and especially to Northern Province, preventing any terrorist incident 
since the defeat of terrorism in Sri Lanka.179 Seventy percent of the area de-mined in the 
Northern Province has been cleared by the military, while the INGO and NGO 
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contribution stands at thirty percent.180  These activities provided an opportunity for 
reestablishment of civil administration in the area, though at the beginning, the civil 
administration lacked the capacity required to support returnees. 
The military has to play the primary role in resettlement in newly liberated areas. 
Due to a shortage of services in newly resettled areas, the military was tasked with 
providing assistance on renovation and construction of damaged houses.181 Even infantry 
were utilized to construct temporary housing for returnees whose houses had been 
completely destroyed. Meanwhile, the military has carried out activities such as 
reconstruction of roads and bridges; cleaning of wells; renovation and reconstruction of 
irrigation systems; renovation and reconstruction of public utilities such as schools, 
religious places, and medical centers; and clearance of agricultural lands that had not 
been used for years.182 The military has monitored and coordinated the livelihood 
support provided to returnees by the GoSL, INGOs and NGOs, preventing any dual 
recipients.183 Per central-bank statistics, Northern Province recorded the highest 
economic growth in Sri Lanka during the year 2010.184 
The military is engaged in many activities in the Northern Province that are aimed 
at further strengthening relations with civilians. It is involved in many activities: donation 
campaigns; organization of medical camps; education seminars and sport championships; 
assistance to religious festivals; tree-planting programs; educational tours to the south, 
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and assistance to needy families.185 It has also taken steps to round up more than 150,000 
stray cattle and hand them to their rightful owners.186 Activities carried out by the 
military to assist the returnees have further developed mutual understanding between 
military and civilians. However, activities undertaken by the military in support of post-
conflict reconstruction have been interpreted by some INGOs, such as Minority Rights 
Group International, as “militarism” in the Northern Province.187  
D. MILITARY PREPAREDNESS AFTER THE CONFLICT 
Though the military was heavily involved in post-conflict reconstruction, 
resettlement, and reintegration, it continues to carry out its traditional security functions. 
All activities related to post-conflict reconstruction, resettlement, and reintegration—
including administration in newly resettled areas—have been carried out through civil-
affairs officers (CAOs) in regional [?] headquarters. CAOs have been given the 
responsibility of providing:  
assistance to government agents/ divisional secretaries on implementing activities 
such as resettlement, livelihood development, infrastructure development for the 
purpose of uplifting the living standard of the community, monitoring of PTF 
approved projects, monitoring activities undertaken by INGOs and NGOs, 
provide required assistance with the coordination of line ministries and 
departments, provide require assistance to win the hearts and minds of the 
population, organize and monitor livelihood development programs and 
introduction of donors and well-wishers and arrange humanitarian assistance.188 
The monitoring of reintegrated cadres does not fall under the purview of CAOs. Since the 
responsibility for reconstruction and resettlement is entrusted to CAOs, the military 
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retained most of its members for conventional roles, engaging in reconstruction, 
resettlement, and reintegration.  
Most of the infrastructure-development projects have been undertaken by field-
engineer regiments and engineer-service regiments. Two of the field-engineer regiments 
were converted into a de-mining regiment and a plant-engineer regiment, to facilitate 
post-conflict reconstruction and resettlement. Though other field-engineer regiments are 
also involved in the reconstruction process, they have been kept under their fighting 
formations. Other than the existing engineer-service regiments, five new engineer-service 
regiments have been formed to boost infrastructure development.189 Other fighting 
formations remain intact, focusing on their conventional roles. However, involvement of 
some infantry regiments in the initial stages of resettlement to support returning families 
was required. Once the returnees were resettled, infantry focused primarily on their 
assigned security role. In the meantime, the military has gradually withdrawn from post-
conflict infrastructure development in the Northern Province as the state capacity, 
developed through donors and INGOs involvement, and the military has started 
withdrawing their administrative work as a civil administration becomes fully established 
and gains capacity.190  
 Since the defeat of the LTTE in 2009, there has also been a demand by civilians 
for military downsizing, restructuring, and reform.191 This has been widely discussed 
among the military, too. However, downsizing the military is possible only if the threat is 
diminished. The LTTE is a well-established organization with a considerable number of 
international offices and front organizations.192 Defeated militarily, LTTE’s international 
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network is still functioning.193 Successful in eliminating the LTTE, the GoSL is presently 
heavily involved in curbing the LTTE international organization. GoSL has arrested the 
former LTTE international wing leader “KP,” stationed in Malaysia in 2010.194  Even 
though the GoSL is committed to curtailing the LTTE international organizations, so far 
its ability to do so has been limited. 
Meantime LTTE activities established the “Transnational Government of Tamil 
Eelam,” with the ultimate aim of establishing a separate state in 2010.195 Some LTTE 
men who escaped arrest or rehabilitation remain at large in Sri Lanka.196 For these 
reasons, the secretary of defense of Sri Lanka has emphasized the possibility of a 
“reemergence of the LTTE” in Sri Lanka.197 The commissioner general of rehabilitation 
has warned reintegrated ex-combatants not to get involved in unlawful activities aimed at 
overthrowing the government.198 Therefore, although the LTTE was militarily defeated, 
its threat has not entirely disappeared, and so far there is no evidence to suggest that 
GoSL is planning to downsize its military. 
The military has taken many steps to retain combat effectiveness. During the 
conflict, the military was unable to send troops to professional military-education 
courses, or even local courses, due to their commitment to the conflict and the shortage of 
manpower. The little professional military training that did occur during the conflict was 
focused on enhancing the skills required in the ongoing conflict. Most of the training was 
carried out in the field within the conflict zone.  After the conflict, the military has taken 
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steps to increase the number of members attending professional military training, locally 
and abroad.199 The Sri Lankan army has established its first state-of-the-art army training 
command (ARTRAC) to “streamline and reformulate army training programs to suit 
international standards and local requirements” to meet future challenges.200 
Furthermore, the military established an officer career-development center (OCDC) 
aimed at “professional development of knowledge on national/international security 
affairs, not only among tri service military students, but also among public officials and 
other academics.”201 In the meantime, the military has strengthened its research and 
development efforts and was able to test-fly the first-ever Sri Lankan-made, unmanned, 
aerial vehicle.202 The military has refrained from using their special forces, support arms, 
armor and artillery, service regiments, and fighting formations of navy and air force for 
reconstruction and resettlement activities. Their military preparedness has not been 
hindered, due to their noninvolvement in reconstruction. While reconstruction in the 
Northern Province was in process, the military conducted joint military exercises 
codenamed “Cormorant Strike I” and “Cormorant Strike II” in Trincomalee and Mannar, 
with the participation of “about 4,000 army, navy and air force officers and other 
ranks.”203 Therefore, it is evident that the Sri Lankan military has retained its 
conventional capabilities, despite its commitment to post-conflict reconstruction, 
resettlement, and reintegration.   
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Participation of the military in United Nations missions will enhance the 
professionalism of the military. Deborah Norden argues that participation in international 
missions provides an opportunity for military to “practice their profession in a publicly 
accepted, and even lauded manner.”204 Janowitz argues that the officer in the 
constabulary force “is subjected to civilian control, not only because of the rule of law 
and tradition, but also because of self-imposed professional standards and meaningful 
integration of civilian values.”205  Meantime, participation of the military in United 
Nation missions will internationalize the military while providing an opportunity for new 
professional roles.206 Furthermore, the Sri Lankan military conducts one-and-a-half 
month’s training for its members departing on United Nations peacekeeping missions in a 
separate training institution. Even amid the conflict, Sri Lankan military participated in 
UN peacekeeping missions, contributing one battalion to Haiti and many observers to 
other missions. “Sri Lanka is currently ranked the 21st contributor of troops and police 
personnel to UN peacekeeping operations in terms of men deployed in several parts of 
the world.”207 Unfortunately, United Nations peacekeeping missions brought discredit to 
Sri Lanka following incidents of sexual abuse by 108 peacekeepers in Haiti in 2007.208 
However, the military took stern action against those found guilty, including the 
commanding officer of the contingent, who was held accountable for the actions of his 
men. This prevented any further incident to date. 
With the end of Sri Lanka’s long conflict, GoSL is looking for opportunities to 
increase the number of personnel sent on United Nations peacekeeping missions.209 
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These missions provide two benefits for a country like Sri Lanka. First, it enhances 
military professionalism. Some of the Sri Lankan officers who participated in United 
Nations peacekeeping missions got the opportunity to work in the United Nations 
headquarters. Deborah Norden argues that the “professional learning which occurs in the 
missions passes from individual to the institution.”210 Participation in United Nations 
peacekeeping missions provides an opportunity to interact with more professional and 
democratically advanced militaries and to use modern equipment not used in Sri Lanka. 
Second, it facilitates foreign exchange and contacts. It provides monetary incentives for 
participants, as well as for the GoSL. Therefore, the GoSL’s decision to send more troops 
on United Nations missions will further ease the government burden of maintaining the 
military, which furthers the GoSL intention to maintain the military at its present 
strength. Although the GoSL managed to increase the military’s strength, it has yet to 
obtain major contributions from the United Nations.   
E. WILL MILITARY CAPACITY UNDERMINE STATE CAPACITY? 
 The military involvement in post-conflict reconstruction has not been restricted to 
the Northern Province. The military has undertaken many national–development projects 
in other parts of the country as well. Prominent projects undertaken by the military 
outside the Northern Province include development and construction of roads, earthworks 
for infrastructure development, cleaning of internal waterways and establishment of 
inland water transportation, construction and management of stadiums and construction 
of bridges, environmental programs,  beatification in Colombo, and repair and renovation 
of roads and tanks in national parks.211  These projects undertaken by the military have 
enabled the GoSL to save a considerable amount of money in infrastructure development 
in the entire country.212 However, not all military units have been used for projects 
outside the Northern Province. Only specialized military regiments in construction and 
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infrastructure development have been tasked to carry out infrastructure development 
projects with the help of a very few infantrymen. Use of the military for construction 
projects outside the Northern Province has been precipitated by a shortage of resources 
and capital within the GoSL and the desire to employ military capabilities productively. 
 The impact and success of military involvement in Sri Lanka for infrastructure 
development has been recognized by other government institutions as well. Some 
government institutions have requested the service of the military for infrastructure 
development. The ministry of education has “made a request to the ministry of defense 
on the possibility of the security forces’ building 1000 national schools at a cost of Rs3.5 
billion [approximately $ 30 million].”213 Over and above these projects, the military has 
taken steps to construct a five-star hotel in Colombo.214 With these developments, the Sri 
Lankan army is presently studying the possibilities of establishing a construction 
company under a separate directorate.215 A separate directorate to look into the 
development of government infrastructure will compete with other construction 
institutions, in accordance with government-tender procedures.  
Establishment of a separate directorate will help directorates to concentrate on 
infrastructure development while enabling the army to preserve its operational 
capabilities. Since the military has such inherent characteristics as task orientation and 
discipline, civilian organizations may find it difficult to compete. Therefore, 
establishment of a separate directorate for infrastructure development may well 
undermine the state capacity while eroding civilian capacities, especially in activities 
relating to infrastructure development.   
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Both during the conflict and after, the government appointed both active and 
retired military officers to administrative positions in the government. Some of the 
primary administrative positions in the Northern and Eastern provinces, such as governor 
and government agent (the highest district-level civil authority) in Trincomalee district 
are presently held by retired military officers.216 The former commander of the Sri 
Lankan navy during the period of the final offensive against LTTE holds the post of 
secretary to the ministry of highways and road development.217 Furthermore, many 
active-duty officers are involved in civil administration in the fields of resettlement and 
reconstruction, rehabilitation and reintegration, and urban development.218 Meanwhile, 
after the conflict, a few active military officers served, and are presently serving, as 
diplomats in the Sri Lankan foreign services and the United Nations.219 In the Northern 
Province, active-duty military were involved in administration at the local-government 
level.220 Appointments of military officials to administrative and diplomatic missions 
have “caused friction between military personnel, career diplomats, and public 
officials.”221 The main reason behind this friction is the adverse impact on the careers of 
civilians who are eligible to hold the same posts. However, the appointment of military 
officials to administrative and diplomatic missions has been based on a government 
strategy of ensuring the sustainable peace in Sri Lanka.  
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The military officers who have been appointed to administrative and diplomatic missions 
have played a major role in curtailing the LTTE international and local networks and 
establishing sustainable peace in formerly conflicted areas.  
After the conflict, the GoSL was under tremendous pressure from the 
international community with regard to war crimes and accountability. Some Western 
countries and INGOs pressed hard on a resolution against Sri Lanka in the United 
Nations and advocated the creation of an international war-crimes investigation in 
relation to civilians killed during the last phase of the conflict.222 The GoSL insisted that 
such an investigation was not required, and the Sri Lankan president appointed a 
commission of inquiry called the “Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission 
(LLRC),” in May 2010.223 LLRC was tasked to look into the Sri Lankan conflict and to 
provide recommendations for an era of healing and peace building. Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Crisis Group declined an 
invitation to testify before the LLRC, highlighting that “its mandate is seriously flawed 
and in practice it falls far short of international standards on national commissions of 
inquiry.”224 
The LLRC conducted its investigation and submitted its report to the president on 
15 November 2011 and made it public on 16 December 2011. However, once the LRRC 
report was published, the international community—including the European Union—
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welcomed the recommendations made by the commission, while the United Nations is 
still studying the report.225 
Based on recommendations forwarded by the commission, the GoSL has decided 
to withdraw the military from “all aspects of community life” including “civil 
administration.”226 This decision taken by the GoSL illustrates that GoSL has used the 
military for administration and community life to establish sustainable peace, speedy 
post-conflict reconstruction, and effective administration of formerly conflicted areas by 
coordinating government mechanisms and the military. However, there is no evidence of 
a withdrawal of the military from infrastructure-development projects aimed at national 
development. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The Sri Lankan military has contributed immensely to post-conflict 
reconstruction, resettlement, rehabilitation, and reintegration. Assistance rendered by the 
military for post-conflict reconstruction started by rescuing civilians from the grip of the 
LTTE. The military was immediately transformed into humanitarian workers rendering 
basic requirements such as food, shelter, and medical care. Furthermore, the military has 
played a major role in the construction of welfare villages and the initial administration of 
basic services until taken over by appropriate civil ministries. The military has supported 
government resettlement strategies by using its organic capabilities to assist in 
reconstruction tasks such as the building of roads, bridges, public infrastructure, irrigation 
systems, and water tanks and the clearing of arable lands overtaken by jungle and scrub, 
as well as de-mining. Part of the infantry and fighting units have been involved in 
supporting accelerated resettlement by constructing temporary accommodation or 
permanent housing for those whose houses were damaged or destroyed. Furthermore, the 
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military has monitored the activities of INGOs in connection with resettlement and 
reconstruction. It is apparent that the military has contributed not only to reconstruction 
and resettlement, it has actively taken part in the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-
combatants, too. Yet though the military is actively involved in the reconstructive 
process, it has preserved its conventional warfighting capabilities to meet any challenges. 
The military has also taken steps to upgrade its capabilities for infrastructure 
development to compete with other institutions on government-tender procedures 
pertaining to infrastructure development. As a whole, the military contribution has 
enormously assisted the government's ability to shape an effective response in post-
conflict reconstruction.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 This study began by exploring the way in which the Sri Lankan military used its 
capabilities to shape the reconstruction process. It is commonly accepted that post-
conflict reconstruction should be carried out principally by civilian agencies and private 
contractors. However, the Sri Lankan military has played a leading role for a variety of 
reasons, beginning with the fact that the war against the LTTE created great destruction 
and a tidal wave of IDPs that had to be housed. Overlapping responsibilities and 
coordination difficulties among government agencies, the reluctance of the international 
community and INGOs to support the GoSL strategy at the end of the conflict, and lack 
of resources within GoSL created conditions that required the government to call upon 
the military to assist in post-conflict reconstruction. The extreme devastation of the 
conflict, together with the absence of a provisional civilian administration in Northern 
Province after the LTTE defeat made the military, especially the army, the primary 
instrument of reconstruction.  
The military has shaped the reconstruction process in many ways. The military 
commitment to reconstruction began even before the end of the conflict, by helping 
civilian authorities construct IDP centers. At the end of the conflict, the military carefully 
planned out its operations to rescue those civilians held hostage by the LTTE or under 
threat of LTTE attack. The military then provided humanitarian assistance, including 
food and medical care, until they transitioned to IDP centers. Due to the mammoth 
number of IDPs, the military constructed and administrated additional IDP centers until 
civilian agencies gained capacity.  The Sri Lankan military was instrumental in carrying 
out development projects such as reconstruction of roads, bridges, irrigation systems, and 
other damaged infrastructure in formerly LTTE-held areas. Furthermore, the Sri Lankan 
military has taken the lead role in de-mining Northern Province. It has coordinated 
resettlement and carried out civil administration until provisional civilian authorities 
could take over. Furthermore, the military has extended its support to returnees by 
assisting them in repairing their damaged houses or providing temporary accommodation 
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and supporting them in livelihood activities. Meanwhile, the military has monitored the 
activities of INGOs in newly liberated areas, in line with GoSL strategy.  
In the field of rehabilitation and reintegration, the military has played a major role 
by apprehending ex-combatants who had merged with IDPs, assisting in rehabilitation 
and monitoring reintegration by helping unemployed ex-combatants to find work. Even 
while the military was heavily involved in reconstruction, it preserved its conventional 
capabilities. The contribution made by the military in post-conflict reconstruction has 
improved government responsiveness by facilitating government resettlement of almost 
all IDPs while reintegrating all rehabilitated ex-combatants, except those under legal 
prosecution.  
Military involvements in reconstruction have varied outcomes. Due to the 
effectiveness of the Sri Lankan military in post-conflict reconstruction and development 
outside Northern Province, government institutions and society recognize the military as 
a potential provider of infrastructure development—but not as the lead institution for this 
endeavor. On the other hand, the presence of the military in the later stages of 
reconstruction has caused some friction with provisional civilian authorities, who resent 
the military’s encroachment into an area that is traditionally a civilian realm, in particular 
the diplomatic and public-services sectors.  Meantime, pro-LTTE fractions among the 
civilians have shown their displeasure at the large military role in reconstruction. Some in 
the international community complain that the extensive use of the military in post-
conflict reconstruction in the Northern Province amounts to militarization, which 
threatens to undermine democracy there. In the meantime, the GoSL decision in 
December of 2011 to begin to withdraw the military from all community life and civil 
administration has gradually reduced the military presence in Northern Province. 
A. ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS  
 While the Sri Lankan military proved to be a very effective fighting force, it 
nevertheless was able to transition rapidly to post-conflict reconstruction for a variety of 
reasons, beginning with the fact that the military is trained to fight and win wars. Its 
organization contains specialist regiments that are trained to undertake the construction of 
bridges, roads, water and electrical supply systems, air fields, de-mining (including 
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dismantling IEDs), and the erection of temporary buildings and infrastructure to support 
the war effort. In this context, the Sri Lankan military has its own field engineer and 
engineer-services regiments, who are trained and equipped for the tasks described. Soon 
after the war, field engineer and engineer-service regiments had the manpower and 
resources to respond swiftly to post-conflict reconstruction without additional training. 
The military has taken steps to form new engineer-service regiments to support 
post-conflict reconstruction. These regiments have strengthened the infrastructure-
development capabilities of the military, helping GoSL expedite its response on post-
conflict reconstruction. The GoSL response has been further enhanced by the dedication 
of two field-engineer regiments for de-mining and plant-engineering missions.  
Although the military can undertake tasks related to its area of specialty, it is not 
capable of undertaking major construction and administration without previous 
experience. Since independence, the military has actively taken part in national 
development projects which have given it much needed training and experience and 
expanded its capabilities in post-conflict reconstruction. The participation of the military 
in such projects enhances its capabilities.  
The previous employment of the military as civil administrators in conflict, post-
conflict, and 2004 tsunami zones has enabled it to perform the same duties in formerly 
LTTE-held areas in support of reconstruction and resettlement. The same was true during 
the JVP insurrection of 1988–1990. Furthermore, the military administered border 
villages during the prolonged conflict, giving it sufficient previous experiences to carry 
out administration in newly liberated areas in support of resettlement and reconstruction. 
B. RETAINING CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES 
 One remarkable feature of the Sri Lankan military’s participation in post-conflict 
reconstruction is that this has been accomplished without sacrificing conventional 
capabilities. This is largely because there has been a division of labor within the military, 
where only field-engineer regiments and engineer-service regiments were tasked to play a 
major role in the reconstruction process. Even though field-engineer regiments have 
taken part actively, they have been kept in their fighting formations to preserve 
operational capabilities. Meantime, a majority of the infantry was used conventionally 
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during reconstruction to face challenges from isolated combatants and apprehend them. 
Participation of a few infantry units in the reconstruction process was required to support 
the returnees. However, those few infantry units reverted to their conventional roles on 
accomplishment of their tasks. 
Furthermore, the military has taken steps to increase the professional military 
education of its members, now that the conflict is over, by increasing the number of 
participants in training courses locally and abroad while establishing new training 
institutions to elevate professional competence. The military has acted to preserve and 
reinforce its conventional capabilities by conducting two joint exercises during the period 
of reconstruction. Together with these measures, the military is trying to increase its 
participation in United Nation peacekeeping missions.  
C. STRENGTHENING STATE CAPACITY  
Some argue that military engagement in reconstruction activities ultimately 
undermines the state’s capacity to provide basic services, since it makes the state more 
dependent on the military while eroding civilian capacities, especially in activities 
relating to development and infrastructure.  
This has proven true for Sri Lanka, where reconstruction activities undertaken by 
the military after the conflict have expanded the military-led infrastructure development 
beyond the Northern Province war zone. The recognition the military achieved through 
those projects for its cost effectiveness and rapid execution has caused other government 
institutions to request military assistance for their infrastructure development. The army 
is carrying out feasibility studies to determine if it should establish a construction 
company to undertake civil infrastructure-development projects with the blessing of the 
GoSL. If this company is created, it will erode civilian capabilities, due to the highly 
organized and discipline structure of the military and its lower overhead costs. The 
government requirement to implement infrastructure-development projects with limited 
resources will create conditions in which the GoSL depends heavily on the military for 
activities relating to development and infrastructure. 
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D. OVERVIEW AND IMPLICATION ON CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS 
Sri Lanka established its military under the guidance of the British after signing a 
defense pack in 1947, prior to independence.227 The British undertook the challenge of 
establishing a Sri Lankan army, navy and air force. Due to this reason, most of the 
officers in the initial stage were British trained, and interestingly the first commanders of 
the tri-services were British officers.228 In the meantime, the first Prime Minister 
instructed his secretary, before the establishment of the Sri Lankan military, that “[w]e 
should never give too much power to our armed forces, or become dependent on 
them.”229 Therefore, the Sri Lankan military is “deeply imbued with British ideas of the 
limited place of the military man in public life.”230       
Bruneau and Tollefson argue that the basic measurement of the “quality of civil–
military relations in a country” is the “existence of a ministry of defense (MOD).”231 The 
Sri Lankan military has been under the control of civilians since its inception. The Sri 
Lankan ministry of defense and external affairs was established soon after independence 
in 1948. The structure of the Sri Lankan ministry of defense provides the opportunity for 
civilians to handle defense matters. It places the chief of defense staff, all tri-service 
commanders, and the inspector-general police under civilian additional secretaries in 
government protocol. Furthermore, the GoSL established the theoretically conceptualized 
NSC in 1999. 
Even in mature democracies, disputes occur between civilian policymakers and 
soldiers over issues of defense policymaking. This phenomenon is most common in 
newly established democracies, whose decision-making mechanisms are developing and 
untested, and where relations between civilians and military leaders lack precedent and 
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tradition.232 An example would be the attempted coup in Sri Lanka in 1962.233 
Therefore, it is important for new democratic regimes to ensure that the military not play 
an interventionist role. 
Huntington argues that professionalism is the main factor which helps to keep the 
solider out of politics. He defines professionalism as composite of expertise, social 
responsibility and cooperate loyalty.234 He argues that these combinations will produce a 
politically neutral professional force (objective civilian control), which will comply with 
the legitimate civilian authority. Besides the attempted coup, Sri Lankan civil–military 
relations have been generally smooth. The Sri Lankan military has remained above the 
political fray, serving various governments, which came to power through democratic 
means.  Furthermore, the Sri Lankan military proved its loyalty by suppressing the JVP 
insurrection in 1971, as well as the second JVP insurrection in 1988–90, and finally, by 
defeating the LTTE, which many believed could not be defeated militarily.235 
Finer identifies possible situations with regard to military interventions, based on 
dispositions and opportunity.236 He argues that the disposition or desire to act wis not 
sufficient for successful military intervention. It must be supported by the “opportunity.” 
Opportunity will arise from the “effect of domestic circumstances” and the “popularity of 
military.”237 Interestingly, after defeating the LTTE, the Sri Lankan military was so 
popular that it certainly had “opportunity,” had it chosen to use it. However, the military 
remained neutral, despite the fact that former commander of the army contested for the 
presidency soon after crushing the LTTE. 
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The engagement of the military in reconstruction provides an opportunity for the 
military to continue its service to the state. Finer argues that a professionalized force will 
intervene in politics, perceiving itself as the servant of the state rather than the 
government in power. Since the Sri Lankan military was involved in a prolonged conflict 
against the LTTE and thereafter in post-conflict reconstruction, there is a possibility that 
the Sri Lankan military will develop a will to political power.  The instant a military 
draws this division between the nation and the democratically elected government, the 
possibility for intervention in politics arises. 
The use of the military for reconstruction has led to civil–military friction among 
a pro-LTTE political faction and the military. In the initial stages of reconstruction and 
resettlement, the entire society and civil administration accepted the military as a 
legitimate post-conflict actor in rescuing civilians from the grip of the LTTE and 
assisting in resettlement. Furthermore, civil administration relied on the military’s ability 
to handle IDPs, reconstruction, and resettlement. Since civil administrations and civilians 
gained capacity, some mostly pro-LTTE fractions among the civilians have shown their 
displeasure about the military role in reconstruction. However, larger constituencies of 
Northern Province still want the military presence.238 
Finer argues that the military may intervene in politics when its perspective 
differs with that of the civilian government with regard to size, organization, recruitment, 
and equipment of forces. Though there are no indications at present of military 
downsizing and reorganization in Sri Lanka, the GoSL curtailed military recruitment and 
equipement after the conflict. So far, there has been no budget deduction three years after 
the conclusion of the conflict. However, if the GoSL starts to downsize the military by 
reorganizing and implementing budget reductions, there is a possibility that the military 
may intervene in politics, counting on popular support to legitimize military action.       
The employment of active-duty military in diplomatic and administrative 
appointments will have a negative impact on civil–military relations. Huntington argues 
that subjective civilian control exists in a variety of forms, maximizing the power of 
                                                 
238 Topix, “Tamil Wants Stronger Military Presence in Jaffna,” January 11, 2011, 
http://www.topix.com/forum/world/sri-lanka/TCVQHQVQ5L2HHLU6I (accessed March 7, 2012). 
  66 
civilians in military affairs. He argues that subjective civilian control will subordinate any 
officer coups to civilian interest and principles. The appointment of active-duty military 
officers to administrative positions and diplomatic missions abroad creates civil–military 
fusion. Huntington disagrees with the subjective civilian control, since it would 
undermine military professionalization, rendering it ineffective.239 Therefore, active-duty 
officer employment in administrative and diplomatic appointments should be curtailed to 
maintain professionalism in the military. Though the GoSL has decided to withdraw the 
military from all aspects of community life, including civil administration, as of 
December 2011, there are still quite a number of officers and enlisted men performing 
civil administration. However, Eleanor Pavey and Chris Smith put it thus: “civil–military 
relations in Sri Lanka have generally been robust—the 1962 coup attempt being the 
exception that proves the rule.”240 
E. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
Centralized strategies incorporated by the GoSL—integrating government 
institutions, the international community, UN agencies, INGOs, and the military—have 
helped the extremely devastated and underdeveloped Northern Province to achieve a 
speedy recovery. Action taken to shape post-conflict reconstruction has enabled the 
military to win the hearts and minds of the Tamil people. Sacrifices made by the military 
in carrying out rescue and de-mining operations have demonstrated the soldiers’ 
willingness to risk their own lives to provide Tamils with better security. Reconstruction 
work carried out by the military strengthens the understanding between the military and 
civilians. Military commitments to finding livelihoods for returnees and reintegrating ex-
combatants have gained access, trust, and approval from the Tamils who suffered most 
during the conflict. This has enhanced the economic strength of Northern Province. 
Though the GoSL was committed to post-conflict reconstruction, LTTE 
international organizations continue to work hard to achieve a separate state in northern 
Sri Lanka. The GoSL commitment to curtailing LTTE international organizations has not 
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been successful, for many reasons. The international community has not cooperated, but 
rather, has accused the GoSL of complicity in civilian casualties during the last stage of 
the conflict.241 LTTE international organizations generate large sums of money through 
legitimate and illegal means to support their causes, funding reputed international 
organizations to discredit the GoSL commitment to post-conflict reconstruction and 
reconciliation.242 GoSL activities in Northern Province has significantly enhanced 
people’s good opinion of the government and facilitated public relations. In this context, 
it is important to monitor how the GoSL counters the intention of LTTE international 
organizations by providing good governance. 
There is a growing demand for effective reconciliation measures after the conflict. 
The international community, especially Western countries, question the absence of 
accountability for civilian casualties during the last stage of the conflict.243 The Sri 
Lankan military was accused of possible war crimes during this phase of the conflict.244  
In the meantime, the United States announced that it will bring in a resolution against the 
GoSL in the March session of the UNHCR in Geneva.245 Others believe that the Sri 
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Lankan reconstruction had led to an illiberal peace.246 Domestically, the GoSL has taken 
reconciliation measures, including the appointment of a parliamentary selection 
committee to address reconciliation.247 The military has also started an investigation of 
possible war crimes.248 In this context, it is interesting to study GoSL initiatives on 
reconciliation and how they address the allegations of the international community. 
Sri Lanka’s successful use of its military in post-conflict reconstruction has 
implications for other nations, both within South Asia and beyond. Many similar violent 
conflicts occurred during the last few decades. However, once those conflicts were 
over—either through a peace accord or outright battlefield victory—post-conflict 
reconstructions was not handled successfully in many cases. Many of those countries 
have returned to conflict. The GoSL has become a model by using its military to fill gaps 
in the government strategy in post-conflict reconstruction, most importantly by 
preserving the conventional capabilities of the military. Use of the military for post-
conflict reconstruction has also helped the GoSL respond promptly and achieve success 
in rebuilding Northern Province.  
While extensive use of the military for post-conflict reconstruction is not the 
norm, in Sri Lanka this approach has pioneered a new dimension in post-conflict 
reconstruction. In the Sri Lankan case, INGOs did not initially cooperate with the 
government, due to its decision to hold IDPs in welfare centers. Furthermore, a drain of 
government resources due to prolonged conflict and reconstruction in Eastern Province 
reduced the ability of the government to conduct post-conflict reconstruction in Northern 
Province. Under these circumstances, if the government had waited to commence post-
conflict reconstruction until after restoring the capabilities of government civilian 
authorities and obtaining INGO assistance, reconstruction would have taken much longer 
and the return to normal would have been delayed. The INGOs contribution also mainly 
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depends on their ability to obtain funds. In this context, the lack of infrastructure delays 
the return to normal conditions. This would have added more fuel to the root causes for 
the conflict, leading to uneven economic development in formerly LTTE-held areas 
because of scarce work and possibly to recurrence of the conflict. The GoSL decision to 
use the military for post-conflict reconstruction to compensate for lack of resources and 
capacity has assisted a speedy recovery in the extremely devastated Northern Province, 
strengthening the possibility that this time, the peace will hold, conflict will not recur, 
and the people of Sri Lanka will come together to live in peace.  
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